THE series of unfortunate and costly decisions made during the two terms of the Bush administration, combined with economic decline at home, might devastate the United States’ world standing much sooner than most analysts predict. What was difficult to foresee is that the weakening of US global dominance, spurred by erratic and unwise foreign policy under the Bush administration, was to reignite a degree of Cold War over a largely distant and seemingly ethnic conflict — that of Georgia and Russia. Who could have ever predicted a possible association between Baghdad, Kabul and Tbilisi?

But to date the decline of US global power to the advent of the Bush administration, or even the horrific events of Sept. 11, 2001, is not exactly accurate. The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and the unfolding of the Warsaw Pact — especially as former members of the pact hurried to join NATO in later years — empowered a new breed of US elite who boasted of the economic viability and moral supremacy of US-style capitalism and democracy. But a unipolar world presented the US leadership with an immense, if not an insurmountable, task.

While 9/11 and a gung-ho president presented a convenient opportunity to reassert US global dominance, action was taken the moment the Soviet Union collapsed. Such efforts, however, were not accentuated until 1997, with the establishment of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a think tank from which many neoconservative policy advisers operated. Their aim was “to promote American global leadership...(which) is both good for America and good for the world.” William Kristol and Robert Kagan, PNAC founders, were inspired by the Reaganite policy of “strength and moral clarity.” But the supposedly inspiring model was justified on the basis of the Cold War, which no longer existed. Fashioning an enemy was a time-sensitive and essential task to justify the repositioning of US power to reclaim domains that were left vacant with the disappearance of the bipolar international system, which existed since World War II.

Even PNAC’s more recent report, “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources For a New Century (2000),” appeared of little relevance and urgency. It expressed the “belief that America should seek to preserve and extend its position of global leadership by maintaining the pre-eminence of US military forces.” The report would have been another neglected document were it not for the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which turned it into a doctrine that defined US foreign policies for nearly a decade.

The wars and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq were projected to strengthen the US hand in protecting its interests and managing its international affairs. Afghanistan’s position was strategic in warding off the regional growth of the rising powers of Asia — aside from its military and strategic value, it was hoped to become a major energy supply route — while Iraq was to provide a permanent US military presence to guard its oil interests in the whole region, and to ensure Israeli regional supremacy over its weaker, but rebellious Arab foes. The plan worked well for a few weeks following the declaration of “Mission Accomplished.” Since then, the US has learned that managing world affairs with a decided military approach is a recipe for disaster. Defeated and humiliated, Iraqis fought back, creating a nightmare scenario and promising a never-to-be-won battle in their country. The US original plan to exploit the country’s fractious ethnic and religious groupings also backfired, as shifting alliances made it impossible for the US to single out a permanent enemy or rely on a long-term ally. In Afghanistan, the picture is even more bleak as the country’s unforgiving geography, the corruption of US local allies, the resurgence of the Taleban — and the US-led coalition’s brutal response to the Taleban’s emboldened ascension — have equally rendered Afghanistan a lost cause by any reasonable military standard.

But the trigger-happy mentality that has governed US foreign policy during the Bush years is no longer dominant and has been since challenged by a more sensible, dialogue-based foreign-policy approach, as championed, reluctantly, by Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama. The change of heart, however, is not entirely moralistic, but largely pragmatic. According to a survey conducted jointly by Foreign Policy magazine and the Center for a New American Security (Feb. 19, 2008), 88 percent of present and former US military officers believe that the demands for the Iraq war alone have “stretched the US military dangerously thin.” Although not “broken”, 80 percent believe it is “unreasonable to expect the US military to wage another major war successfully at present,” as reported by CNN. Such estimation is not too different from similar assessments provided by top US military commanders, most of whom found their way to early retirement for obvious reasons.