US President Barack Obama is yet to decide the future course of one of the most crucial files of America’s foreign policy, one that has characterized almost a decade in this third millennium. The war on terror has been America’s mission in the post-9/11 world. Initially, the war focused on Afghanistan, the base of the Taleban and Al-Qaeda. It quickly evolved into a doctrine, embraced by neoconservatives, whose goal was to build a new strategic order imposed by US military might.

That order gave us the twisted logic of pre-emptive strikes, regime change, extrajudicial incarceration and torture of so-called enemy combatants. It is the same logic that facilitated the invasion of Iraq through a war that George W. Bush demanded and whose administration justified as the only way to destroy Saddam Hussein’s arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and to sever his alleged ties with Al-Qaeda. These accusations were proved false later on.

Under these pretexts, America waged a war on Iraq, toppled its regime and engulfed the country in a bloody cycle of violence that claimed thousands of lives and led to unspeakable horrors against civilians including the torture scandal at Abu Ghraib. The war on terror promoted a global culture of fear, distrust and acrimony. America’s unilateralism and self-serving approach to international crisis prevailed.

But as the US sunk deeper in the Iraqi quagmire its focus began to shift from the primary front in the war against terror which is Afghanistan. After the dramatic expulsion of the Taleban from Kabul and the appointment of a pro-US government under Hamid Karzai, the bulk of US military and diplomatic resources were diverted to Iraq.

As a result, America’s declared objectives in Afghanistan were not met. It had failed to capture Osama Bin Laden and was unable to help the Kabul government extend its authority beyond the capital and the northern provinces. This allowed the Taleban to regroup and invest in tribal affiliations in the south and along the porous borders with Pakistan.

Making use of its Pashtun tribal base in the south and internal Pakistani turmoil, the Taleban were able to reconstitute itself as a potent militant power at a time when the Karzai government fell short on its promise to deliver prosperity and change across the country.

And when Washington realized that the security situation in Afghanistan had reached a critical level, it could only respond with more firepower. Through indiscriminate bombings and against the protests of the Karzai government it ended up killing innocent civilians and enraging the public. Last year, more than 450 civilians were reported to have perished, some while attending weddings, as a result of US bombardment.

It became clear that the US government had lost the initiative and was unable to formulate a new approach in Afghanistan beyond the deployment of troops. As the Taleban gained ground and began to pose a serious challenge to NATO forces, America discovered that its strong ally in Pakistan, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, had become vulnerable.

Pakistan was viewed as a crucial partner in the fight against terror and Al-Qaeda. And yet the military leader in Islamabad failed to subdue the rebellious provinces along the Afghan borders. It was there that the Taleban, and Al-Qaeda, had found refuge and support. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 and the political turmoil that ensued finally sealed the general’s fate. Washington was about to lose its ally in Pakistan.

And so seven years after the launch of the war on terror, which resulted in the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, America found itself looking at the troubling prospect of a Taleban resurgence if not eventual triumph. On the other hand, political uncertainty in Pakistan had given extremist groups a bigger role in the political stage at a time when the civilian government of Asif Ali Zardari was fighting for survival.

Obama recognized the dangerous connection between Afghanistan and Pakistan even before his election. He warned that unless the focus in the war on terror shifted back to Afghanistan America’s efforts to stem Al-Qaeda and hunt down Bin Laden would fail. He vowed to send more troops and forge a new policy on Pakistan. He named Richard Holbrooke as special envoy and distanced himself from the Karzai government, which he viewed as unpopular and corrupt.

Karzai responded by sending distress signals to the outside world while inviting the Taleban to join a national unity government, something that the US would not accept. But the man who for years had enjoyed America’s trust and backing was preparing himself for the worst.

Holbrooke’s mission will not be easy, to put it mildly. What Obama desires might not be possible. The Europeans, who are asked to send in more troops, are under popular pressure to get out of Afghanistan.

Pakistan is going through tumultuous times as it tries to mend its relations with India in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks. And public opinion in Pakistan is already enraged at US aerial attacks on the border areas of Waziristan, which have claimed many victims, the majority are believed to be civilians.

In addition, Zardari’s civilian government is struggling to stay alive while anxious army generals and the influential intelligence service observe closely. And what Zardari wants now, which is to reconcile with rebel tribal leaders who support the Taleban, may not appeal to the Americans.

For now the Obama administration will conduct a major review of its policy in Afghanistan. But such review might not come up with satisfactory answers. There is no simple way out of the current crisis. Karzai is not easily replaced and Pakistan is far more complicated than anyone can fathom. The country’s fragile democracy may ultimately play into the hands of America’s foes. On top of all this there is the tension between Pakistan and India, two nuclear powers, which could deteriorate at any moment.

In the end Obama will have to deal with the legacy that was left by the Bush administration. The mismanagement of Afghanistan may prove to be an irreparable mistake. As Holbrooke and his team look into available options it would be wise to remember that on the 20th anniversary of the departure of the last Soviet soldier from Afghanistan, this ancient country of complex anachronisms may in fact present a dilemma that can never be surmounted.

— Osama Al Sharif is a Jordanian political commentator.