Following Israel’s Gaza and northern West Bank disengagement, the focus has shifted to the Palestinians in terms of establishing law and order, and disarming militant groups. While the issue of Palestinian security is critical, primarily to the Palestinians themselves and their prospects for statehood, the issue cannot be isolated and addressed without the recognition that it is part of a larger political environment. The successful fulfillment of Palestinian security responsibilities both internally and as regards Israel, short of a confrontation with militant groups, can certainly be accomplished in the short term. The sustaining of such responsibilities however, is not possible without prospects for a future Palestinian state that fulfills the minimum aspirations of the Palestinian people.

Since the January 2005 election of President Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinians have consolidated the security agencies from sixteen to three, appointed a new interior minister, retired all members of the security services over 60 years of age, and developed a communications plan that will better enable the security services to work with people in the community. Most importantly, the cease-fire Abbas secured from militant groups, although tested at times, is now approaching nine months, something Israel was never able to achieve. In addition, Abbas has secured a recent pledge from militant groups to end mass public displays of weapons and end all attacks against Israel from Gaza.

These steps, while incomplete, fulfill many Palestinian obligations under Phase 1 of the road map, which include a cease-fire, “beginning” the dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure and “commencing” confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority. Phase 1 of the road map, in its opening sentence, also refers to Israel taking “reciprocal” steps, many of which such as an end to settlement expansion, outpost removal and army withdrawal to pre-intifada positions, have not been fulfilled.

Irrespective of Israeli compliance, the Palestinians can and must do more in the short term. According to an independent third party study conducted in July 2005 by Strategic Assessments Initiative and commissioned by US Gen. William Ward, these include streamlining and fully integrating the Palestinian security sector under the Interior Ministry; establishing an independent judiciary to sustain security sector reform; aggressively patrolling and preventing the launching of rockets by militants against Israel; establishing a visible security presence on the Palestinian street; and sealing the border with Egypt in terms of the smuggling of weapons.

Recent surveys demonstrate Palestinian public support for these recommendations. A poll conducted by An-Najah University in the West Bank shows that 62 percent of Palestinians oppose launching attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip now that it has been evacuated. In addition, the same majority is in favor of the collection of weapons from militant groups.

More recently, a just— published survey by two Swiss-based groups, the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Graduate Institute for Development Studies at Geneva University, revealed the following about Palestinians: A majority perceive Israeli occupation as the main threat to their security, with the lack of socioeconomic improvement ranking second; while a majority of Palestinians place high trust in militant groups as opposed to the PA, they also support the dissolving of militant groups; almost 90 percent of Palestinians support security sector reform and fighting corruption and nepotism.

Achieving long-term security is a different ballgame altogether and this is where the importance of the political environment becomes apparent. President Abbas’ very mandate rests on the premise that the political process and the abstaining from violence will lead to a viable and independent Palestinian state, a mandate that has yet to bear fruit for his people. On the contrary, Israeli unilateral actions on the ground in the West Bank, whether confiscation of land, settlement expansion, the encirclement of East Jerusalem and the continued stranglehold over Palestinian movement of commerce and people, all serve to undermine both Abbas as a leader and his message of moderation.

These actions, combined with Israel’s refusal to allow the basic rearmament of the Palestinian security services or the transit of donated European military equipment through Israeli ports, make it impossible for the PA to confront any of the better armed and organized militant groups should the need arise.

The head of Israeli military intelligence has warned of a return to violence and a Hamas victory in Palestinian legislative elections if Palestinians are not presented with a credible “political horizon” for statehood soon, and unilateral Israeli actions continue in the West Bank and Jerusalem

The issue of Hamas’ disarmament prior to Palestinian elections was not brought up at the Bush-Abbas meeting nor at the press conference that followed.

As a result the Israeli justice minister, a close Sharon ally, stated on Oct. 23 that although Israel would continue to try to press the Abbas to disarm Hamas beforehand or even to postpone the elections, it is impractical to try to hinder the elections.

Palestinian elections are a vital stage in Abbas’ plan to impose law and order. The decisive stage in the process of disarming militant groups will follow the elections, when in Abbas’s view, even if Hamas does well in the elections, its participation in the PA’s legislative and executive institutions will inevitably moderate its political positions and, equally importantly, make it accountable to the Palestinian public.

The formula for the successful fulfillment of Palestinian security responsibilities and their sustaining in the long term is a complex issue tied into capability, reform, political environment, upcoming elections and Israeli actions.

By neglecting or ignoring one or more of these aspects, neither Palestinian nor Israeli security interests are served.

— Raafat Dajani is executive director, American Task Force on Palestine based in Washington.