The visit paid to Israel by the foreign ministers of Egypt and Jordan earlier this week may or may not deserve the label “historic” used by many commentators. What is certain, however, is that it may well represent a first step toward breaking the seven-year old stalemate in the Arab-Israel peace process.

The visit was certainly of some symbolic value. The two ministers went to Israel as representatives of the League of Arab States that has thus acknowledged the end of its 50-year old boycott of Israel, at least implicitly.

To be sure, the two envoys that the league sent are foreign ministers of the only two Arab states that have already made peace with Israel. Thus, the league could always backtrack by claiming that its other members, still technically at war with Israel, have not been committed to any particular policy vis-à-vis the Jewish state.

Nevertheless, the two envoys were not there on a showing-the-flag exercise only. They took with them the broad outline of a plan for peace that has already won the support of a majority of the league members and been endorsed by the seven most influential Muslim states.

The plan is the brainchild of Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah who unveiled its basic principles almost five years ago. At the time, Israel dismissed the plan as nothing but a public relations exercise by the Saudis who wished to divert attention from the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Five years later, Israel’s President Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert admit that the plan is a serious diplomatic proposal, and should be treated with something other than disdain.

Ever since efforts to make peace between Israel and the Arabs started in the late 1960s, we have witnessed two approaches.

The first could be described as “incremental” or, in the words of Henry Kissinger, “step-by-step” diplomacy.

The incremental method assumed that the two protagonists have had so traumatic an experiment that only a slow process of reconciliation might persuade them to set aside their mutual suspicions and engage in a give-and-take process.

Initially, Israel was opposed to such a method and insisted on a global peace settlement with its Arab neighbors. On that basis, Prime Minister David Ben Gurion’s government rejected an offer of peace from the then Syrian dictator Hosni Al-Zaim for a separate peace that included the absorption of a good part of the Palestinian refuges by Syria.

After the 1967 war the situation was reversed: While Israel became amenable to separate peace deals, the Arab states rallied around Egypt to reject any contact with the Jewish state.

The incremental method was restored as the favorite instrument of peacemakers when Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat made his historic trip to Jerusalem in 1977. Sadat’s move swept aside many Israeli inhibitions. However, it also gave birth to the illusion that any Arab “strongman” could suddenly change his mind about the Jewish state and offer it peace.

Some analysts argue that Israeli longings for another Sadat prevented them from adequately probing the possibility of making peace with the late Syrian leader Hafiz Assad.

What few Israelis took into account was the fact that Sadat made his move after a long period of gestation in which he reoriented Egypt’s national strategy both at home and abroad by de-Nasserizing all aspects of policy.

He abrogated the alliance with the Soviet Union, purged the pro-Soviet elements in the Egyptian leadership, and sent thousands of Soviet military and civilian “advisers” packing. Instead, he built a close alliance with the Shah of Iran, a long-time foe of Nasser, and, with Iranian mediation, established a new relationship with Washington. Sadat also dismantled Nasser’s pseudo-socialistic economic policy, replacing it with an Egyptian band of capitalism known as “infitah” (opening).

The fact that Egypt, as the most populous Arab nation was still unrivalled in its regional leadership claims made it easier for Sadat to make his dramatic move.

Finally, Sadat opted for peace when, having started the 1973 war, he realized that the Arabs would not be able to defeat Israel on the battleground anytime soon.

Israel’s dreams of finding another Sadat were doomed from the start.

Sadat was unique in almost every way; they broke the mold when they made him. This is why Shimon Peres, despite his warm embrace, was unable to transform Yasser Arafat into a mini-Sadat. Not every toad is transformed into a prince with a passionate embrace.

With the Saudi peace plan, now adopted by the Arab League, we may be witnessing a new method of seeking peace that is synthesis of the incremental and the dramatic methods. The approach is certainly incremental in the sense that the plan envisages a period of behind-the-scenes contacts, formal negotiations, and detailed diplomatic footwork.

Its goal, however, could be described as global: Once a deal is reached, Israel would be recognized by the Arab League, and possibly the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as well, alongside a nascent Palestinian state. As for the Golan Heights, it could be transferred to the Arab League, or the United Nations, for a “cooling period” of 10 to 15 years before it is handed back to Syria.

However, when all is said and done the latest initiative is unlikely to lead anywhere unless Israel comes out with its own peace plan. History has never witnessed peace being made solely through negotiations between the victor and the vanquished without the latter first putting its terms on the table.

Diplomatic archives are full of various “Middle East peace plans” presented by various Western and Arab political figures. What we have never seen, however, is an Israeli peace plan.

Now that everyone seems to agree on the so-called “two states” formula, we have to ask a simple question: Which of the two states it is easier to create? The obvious answer is Israel that has been a member of the UN for 50 years, has functioning state institutions, and generally behaves as a classic nation-state. And, yet, the Israelis have not yet succeeded in agreeing on the exact physical contours of their state, its final place on the map.

Without knowing where exactly the Israelis want Israel to be, it would be impossible to imagine the space in which the second state, the Palestinian one, could be shaped.

As war victor and the power that holds the territories in dispute, Israel has the moral and legal responsibility of coming out with a plan showing what it will accept and what it will not. Once such a plan is on the table, the Arabs can define themselves for or against aspects of or even all of it. Without an Israeli position at the start of the process, no Arab negotiator would be able to offer what is not accepted or accept what is not offered.