Iran and this dog’s dinner of diplomatic deception


Iran and this dog’s dinner of diplomatic deception

“Trump violates international treaty!” “Trump tears up pact signed by world powers!” 
These were some of the headlines when US President Donald Trump’s refused to certify Iran’s compliance with the “nuclear deal.” Some in the Western media said would complicate the task of curbing North Korea as Pyongyang might conclude that reaching any deal with the world powers, as Iran did, was useless.
But what is it exactly that Trump has done?
Before answering that question let’s deal with another question. Is Obama’s Iran “deal” a treaty? 
The answer is: No.
It is, as Tehran says “a roadmap” in which Iran promises to take some steps in exchange for “big powers” reciprocating by taking some steps of their own. 
Even then, the “roadmap,” or “wish-list” as former US Secretary of State John Kerry described it, does not have an authoritative text; it comes in five different versions, three in Persian and two in English, with many differences. Nor has it been submitted to, let alone approved by, the legislative bodies of any of the countries involved.
The various texts do not envisage any arbitration mechanism to decide if it has been implemented. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was not involved in shaping the deal, is charged with assessing and, if possible, certifying, Iranian compliance. But there is no mechanism for assessing and certifying whether other participants have done what they are supposed to do.
Legally speaking, the so-called deal doesn’t exist and thus cannot be “torn up” by anybody.
The trouble with the “deal” starts with its genesis.
Jack Straw, a former British Foreign Secretary, has told me that the idea began at a meeting in his official residence in London with then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The IAEA had established that Iran had violated the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and had asked the UN Security Council to take action. The UNSC had passed resolutions that Iran had rejected because the mullahs didn’t want to appear to be repeating Saddam Hussein’s “mistake” of walking into “UN resolutions trap.”
Straw came up with the idea of creating an ad hoc group to work out a deal with Tehran, by-passing the IAEA and the Security Council, thus flattering the mullahs that they were given special treatment because their regime was special. 
Rice was receptive and initiated a “bold move” by inviting then secretary of Iran’s High Council of National Security Ali Ardeshir, alias Larijani, to Washington exactly at the time that Straw was about to leave office. 
Over 100 US visas were issued for Larijani and his entourage. But Iran’s “Supreme Guide” vetoed the visit at the last minute.
When Barack Obama entered the White House, he revived the scheme and after secret talks with Tehran in Oman, arranged by his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, he transformed the idea into a process.

The nuclear ‘deal’ is not a treaty, has not been approved by any legislative body and legally does not exist — so there was nothing for Donald Trump to tear up.

Amir Taheri

Tehran felt that in Obama it had a friend in Washington, and Obama went out of his way to woo and flatter the mullahs. 
He created a parallel Security Council, composed of the five “veto” holding powers plus Germany which was and remains Iran’s principal trading partner. The concoction, dubbed P5+1, was never given official status. It was not formally and legally appointed by anybody, had no written mission statement, implied no legal commitment for members and was answerable to no one. 
Tehran accepted the trick with its usual attitude of sulking pride. 
Larijani’s successor, Saeed Jalili, boasted that the Islamic Republic’s “special status” was recognized by “big powers,” implying that such things as NPT or even international law as a whole didn’t apply to Iran.
Jalili proved a pain in the neck. He saw talks with the P5+1 as a mechanism for Iran to suggest, if not dictate, the course of events on a global scale. 
He was not ready to talk about Iran’s nuclear cheating unless the P5+1 also discussed Iran’s plans for a range of international problems. In one meeting, Jalili displayed his “package” dealing with “problems that affect humanity,” from the environment to the “total withdrawal of the American Great Satan” from the region.
Somewhere along the way, the European Union, encouraged by Britain and Germany, hitch-hiked and secured a side-chair alongside the P5+1. The idea was to use the EU foreign policy point-person as leverage against Iranians who appeared unwilling to play.
Once Jalili was out of the picture, and the new Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, named his Foreign Minister Mohammed-Javad Zarif as point-man, things began to move fast. 
During his long years in the US, part of it as diplomat in New York, Zarif had established contacts with the Democratic Party, including John Kerry who took over from Clinton as secretary of State. Zarif persuaded his bosses not to miss “the golden opportunity” provided by Obama’s administration which included many “sympathizers” with Iran. 
Thus, in just two years. what had proved impossible for 10 years became possible. 
A vague text was established, fudging the issue, and declaring victory for both sides. The participants in the game agreed to keep the text away from their respective legislatures so as not to risk scrutiny of the witches’ brew they had cooked.
The so-called “deal” was dubbed a non-binding “roadmap,” implying that the “roadmap” isn’t the same as the journey. Two years after unveiling, the ”roadmap” remains just that. 
Neither Iran nor the P5+1 have delivered on their promises. Iran’s path to developing nuclear weapons remains open, although this doesn’t mean that Tehran is currently making a bomb. For their part, the P5+1 have not canceled the sanctions imposed on Iran. 
Both sides have lied to one another and to their respective audiences.
Obama has left a dog’s dinner of diplomatic deception. Interestingly, Trump hasn’t thrown that dog’s dinner into the dustbin, but promises to rearrange and improve it.
Is that possible?
• Amir Taheri was executive editor in chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran from 1972 to 1979. He has worked at, or written for, innumerable publications and published 11 books. Twitter:  @AmirTaheri4
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News' point-of-view