Assessing India, Lanka N-deal

Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena’s recent India trip was touted by many as another victory for the Modi government on foreign policy front. While both the nations inked four bilateral agreements, the one on nuclear cooperation drew more attention, though there remains a genuine confusion regarding the nature of the nuclear pact.
While Modi described it as a civil nuclear cooperation agreement by way of which India would help Sri Lanka develop nuclear capability for peaceful use, Sirisena, however, preferred to call it a nuclear safety deal. Many would rightly ask, why this fuss over nomenclature when Colombo is clearly tilting toward India after years of pro-China overtures under Mahinda Rajapaksa’s regime? Indeed, the debate should revolve around factual details. But undoubtedly, the main thrust of the Indo-Lankan nuclear deal is on allaying the fears in Sri Lanka about possible radiation exposure risk from India’s Kudankulam nuclear power station located just across the Palk Strait. Experts, familiar with nuclear negotiations, believe that it is more of an assurance to help Sri Lanka meet any possible radiation disaster emanating from the Kudankulam plant in neighboring Tamil Nadu rather than setting-up nuclear power stations in the island nation to augment clean energy production.
One must not forget that the agreement enables India and Sri Lanka to share expertise on radioactive waste management, nuclear disaster mitigation as well as environmental protection. Also, Sri Lankan personnel are supposed to receive training in the use of radioisotopes, nuclear and radiation safety and nuclear security from Indian nuclear safety experts. Yes, there is no denying that this was a bold attempt to take Colombo on board given the fact that senior Sri Lankan politicians have expressed safety concerns vis-à-vis Kudankulam nuclear reactors, situated 250 kilometers north of Mannar, renowned for pearl fishery.
That the Indian government has succeeded in reassuring Colombo sufficiently is reflected in power and energy minister Champika Ranawaka’s signing of the nuclear accord. Sources privy to the development also confirms that this was a subtle way of co-opting Sri Lanka into India’s domestic nuclear pacification agenda and monitoring mechanism of the controversial nuclear plant. A worried Colombo, in fact, had threatened to approach the international nuclear watchdog IAEA over possible impact of radiation along Sri Lanka’s northwestern coastline. Indeed, many in India too had similar misgivings because the nuclear project has been commissioned without any legal environmental impact assessment, a fact clearly admitted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests in a sworn affidavit filed in the Madras High Court. Besides, some independent analyst continues to be apprehensive about the efficacy and quality of the Russia (technology provider and contractor for Kudankulam nuclear power plant) vetted site evaluation and safety analysis report.
Now that New Delhi has, apparently, succeeded in yanking the present Sri Lankan leadership away from Chinese influence, does it mean that India will benefit commercially if and when Sri Lanka chooses to pursue civil nuclear energy? But then, Colombo was more inclined to seeking Pakistan’s collaboration for utilizing nuclear energy in industrial applications as well as in the fields of medicine and agriculture. This author understands reliably that it was Moscow’s quiet yet effective behind-the-scenes strategic diplomacy — and not Modi’s charisma — that paved the way for a Sri Lankan turnaround. But despite the longstanding Indo-Russian bonhomie, Moscow is unlikely to let India gain a monopoly over Sri Lanka’s incipient nuclear sector for obvious reasons.
Whether India can exploit the bilateral nuclear agreement to get a major share of Sri Lanka’s nuclear business pie will determine if Modi’s much vaunted diplomatic skill is real or merely a well-funded propaganda to make a hero out of nothing. With China breathing down neck and Sirisena refusing to play ball blindly, as he cleverly avoided giving any commitment to the Indian leadership on strategic realignment in the region, New Delhi is stuck on a sticky wicket. True, Sri Lankan Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe made some favorable noises recently regarding the legality of $1.5 billion port city project (perceived as a major strategic threat to India) that China is tasked with building next to Colombo harbor. But it is very unlikely that an astute Sirisena will ever put all of Sri Lanka’s strategic eggs in one basket despite the carrots (of enhanced economic co-operation) dangled by Modi.
Rather, Sri Lankan officials have assured their Chinese counterpart that projects allotted to China will remain untouched. There are also talks of Sirisena visiting Beijing sometime soon to offset India’s diplomacy of strategic coercion. Given the bitterness over India’s fluctuating position throughout Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict and display of regional hegemonism, Colombo very rightly wants to chart out an independent foreign policy course. However, there is still a window of opportunity for New Delhi to play a leadership role in shaping Sri Lanka’s future in atomic energy. Former chairman of Sri Lanka’s Atomic Energy Authority, Prof. Wimaladharma Abeywickrama acknowledges that his country’s capacity to produce nuclear power is in an embryonic state and will require external assistance to commission a plant by 2031 — the target year. Since, India is preparing to develop and export thorium nuclear reactors – especially the low enriched uranium variant — which can operate for 120 days without human control and last 100 years, Sri Lanka can be the biggest regional beneficiary because such reactor is manageable with modest industrial infrastructure.