Changing Middle East and Obama’s foreign policy

FOR the first time in decades, people in the Middle East are not paying attention to the upcoming American presidential elections. The assumption that the United States is key to war, peace, and change in the Arab world can no longer be taken at face value given the sweeping Arab Spring that has posed new challenges to Washington and has exposed the limits of American power in the region.
While I do not want to get into the issue of whether or not America is on the decline particularly in the Middle East, it is really difficult to envision a sea change in the region without a major American input. There is still no other world power that can compete with America in the Middle East despite the fact that regional and internal developments in a great majority of the Arab world pose unprecedented challenges to the American role in the region. Washington can do itself a big favor if it can understand and deal with the new local players in the Middle East.
“Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy” by Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michael E. O’Hanlon, which was recently published in Washington, offers a fair and balanced perspective on how the United States under President Barack Obama has fared. The book is an assessment of President Obama’s foreign policy. The main argument in this book is that Obama is a hybrid president, someone that can be dubbed as a “progressive pragmatist,” to use the language of the authors. In their assessment of his performance, they make a compelling case by writing that in his bid to realize his objectives, “Obama’s foreign policy has repeatedly manifested a combination of the realist’s pragmatic approach to the world as it is and the idealist’s progressive approach to a new world order that he seeks to shape.” And yet, his attempt to bend the arc of history toward peace, stability, and justice in the Middle East have run aground after he manifested ineffectiveness with regard to making peace on the Arab-Israeli track. It is not that he did not know what to do! In fact, his speech in Cairo was the epitome of a proper understanding of the injustice done to Palestinians and what should be done to create a region of peace. Many in the Middle East at that time thought that finally the Untied States would do a great job and refurbish its image after years of being part of the problem in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Reality was tough! Though President Obama took initial steps and sent a clear message that he meant business, he soon came to the realization that he over-exaggerated his ability to influence the course of events. Although the authors wrote that “Obama has proven to be progressive where possible but pragmatic when necessary,” they concede that he raised the bar of his goals while following a more cautious and gradual foreign policy. This is exactly where Obama is criticized most.
On the whole, the book offers a point-by-point evaluation of the administration performance in foreign policy in key issues ranging from managing the ascendance of China to the war on terror. Nonetheless, my main interest here is his performance in the Middle East. While the authors rightly identify some modest achievements, the main issue behind the increasing amount of anti-American sentiments in the Arab world is still unresolved. With Israel’s obsession over the Iranian nuclear challenge and the Palestinians ongoing disunity, it is not possible to think of any progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Additionally, the unexpected eruption of the Arab Spring and the success of masses in Tunisia and Egypt to make history caught the American administration off guard. All along the Arab Spring, American foreign policy has been defensive and reactive. In Syria, Washington has yet to demonstrate leadership. Assad’s killing of his people in cold blood while the world is watching is nothing b