Assad stays defiant
The most recent statements made by Assad himself show no sign of backing down, let alone stepping down.
Explicit in his statements is his perception of the importance of his troops’ military gains in the last few weeks. The changing balance of power in favor of his troops has emboldened him to cling onto two uncompromising positions. First, he said that he would not step down for a transitional government; and second, he said that he may run for presidential elections in 2014.
Assad’s apparent confidence should surprise no one. While his allies have been helping him in arms and men, the rebels have been left alone. Key to understanding the predicament of the rebels and Assad’s confidence is the wishy-washy American position. In fact, it is a common understanding in the wider Middle East that the United States’s hesitant policy has only given Assad, rather than the rebels, a boost in morale. For this reason, many would ponder whether President Obama wants Assad to survive.
The resilience of the regime — thanks to the active help of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah — may push Obama to see Assad’s survival as a realistic option for American interests. I know that such a claim is hard to substantiate, but the inaction on the part of the administration leaves little room to think differently. This feeling is almost an ubiquitous one in this part of the world.
US Secretary of State John Kerry has conceded to his Russian counterpart to convene the mooted Geneva II conference. It seems as if the Obama administration seeks the conference at any cost to deflect mounting calls within the United States to assume a more active role in the conflict.
Just a week ago, John McCain crossed the border with Syria to meet the rebel forces. On the heels of McCain’s visit to the north of Syria, President Obama has consulted with the Pentagon for the first time about plans for a no-fly zone over Syria. Almost two months ago, McCain made a public call on the President to arm the rebels in Syria, to strike the Syrian forces and to help create safe haven for refugees. Obama realizes that the conflict has to come to an end. In fact, the more it continues, the more likely his administration finds itself compelled to intervene.
A Geneva II conference provides the best possible way to end the conflict without the need for American military intervention. And yet, there is a reasonable probability that the conference fails to deliver the desired outcome. In this case, Obama will have a difficult time justifying inaction. In this case, there will be more at stake than keeping America out of Syria; indeed, the American credibility in the region will be damaged beyond recovery.
The flip side of the coin tells a different story. Russia and its allies in Syria are actively changing the balance of power within Syria. To them, America has become a tiger of paper with no teeth. It is not unnatural in this case to take full advantage of the situation and try to inflict heavy losses on the rebels. For this reason, Hezbollah troops are fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with governmental troops to chalk up a clear victory in some strategic locations.
Apparently the American strategy to bring about the demise of the regime through diplomacy has run aground. Had the American administration provided lethal weapon to the opposition, Assad would have opted for a more compromising conduct. Yet, Assad does not feel that his troops are losing ground to the opposition. Additionally, the Russians will use the Geneva II conference to buy time for the deployment of advanced weapons in Syria — with the purpose of raising the cost of external intervention — and to restore the regime legitimacy.
I think that early American calculations that President Putin can be manipulated to force Assad to depart have been proven to be naïve. All along, Putin has worked to realize one objective: to undermine the Western goal of bringing about a regime change in Syria so that he can restore the Russian influence in the Middle East. Short of a decisive Western intervention to change the balance of power within Syria, the prospects for a political settlement are dim and the chances for Assad’s defiance to continue are high.
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