How Mursi ousted himself

The recent removal of President Mursi of Egypt has given additional proof that democracy is much more than elections, no matter how orderly and honest. Examples from Iran to Iraq to Egypt have shown how majority rule was quickly transformed simply into tyranny of the majority.
When Dr. Muhammed Mursi was elected president of Egypt in June 2012, many welcomed his victory and hoped that a new era of democracy had dawned on Egypt. On June 30, 2012, the day he was sworn in as president I was in Stockholm. From there I wrote about the world’s excitement over the event, as the first time Egypt had chosen a democratically elected president in a freely contested poll (Arab News: Revenge of the nerds and the post post-colonial order, July 1, 2012).
At the same time there was trepidation. Egypt, with probably the oldest state structure in recorded history, did not really have a solid democratic tradition, many said. More to the point, the political culture of the Muslim Brotherhood, the power behind Mursi, made many uneasy, inside Egypt and abroad.
I expressed those doubts and misgivings in the same piece I wrote for this paper then. I pointed out that the challenges facing Mursi were too great to predict a smooth evolution of Egypt into a sustainable democracy overnight.
For starters, Mursi was not really given a clear mandate. He did not win a majority in the first round, and won the runoff by only a slim (51.7) percent majority in a low-turnout election. I also pointed out that there was justifiable fear that the Muslim Brotherhood movement, the force behind Mursi and his Freedom and Justice Party, might try to exercise extra-legal influence behind the scenes.
Mursi and his backers seemed to quickly forget his weak mandate and the fact that he had been elected merely to chaperon an interim arrangement, chosen to draw up a new constitution and negotiate a new social contract between Egyptians and their government.
As such, it was counterproductive for that interim government to monopolize power and exclude minorities, be they political, social, regional, ethnic or religious.
At the heart of the problem was confusion over the real meaning of democracy between majority rule and tyranny exercised by that majority.
Mursi seemed unable or unwilling, from the start, to create an inclusive government. After winning both parliamentary and presidential elections, Mursi, the Justice and Freedom Party and the Muslim Brotherhood went ahead to govern without coalitions and with a single-minded agenda that defied vocal opposition from many sides, including their partners in the coalition that made it possible for Mursi to win the election in the first place.
Inexperience mixed with haste in the widely publicized exercise of drafting and passing Egypt’s new constitution. Independent and non-Brotherhood members of the Constituent Assembly tasked with drafting the new constitution abandoned the effort, but Brotherhood delegates single-handedly drafted a new text. Critics complained that the new document did little to protect basic freedoms and minority rights. On Nov. 22, 2012, Mursi made matters worse by issuing his own constitutional declaration that made his decrees immune from judicial oversight. Egyptians took to the streets in protest. Although he rescinded parts of that declaration, the damage was already done.
That naked power grab, combined with failure to restore calm and economic activity, eroded Mursi’s appeal. The rise in common crimes further disillusioned Egyptians about the new government. Although the security services remained largely intact, they seemed unable to fulfill Mursi’s promises to restore public order.
Sectarian violence was also on the rise. The Coptic minority complained of increased sectarian strife and animosity. Mursi failed, in the eyes of many Egyptians, to lead in the face of heightened sectarian tensions.
On the economic front, the new government made a mess of things. Egypt is the most populous Arab country (85 million inhabitants). Its $260 billion GDP makes it the third largest economy, after Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. The chaos and mismanagement cut its growth by almost two thirds. Credit rating agencies reduced its standing by several notches.
Negotiations with the IMF were stop-and-go and the long awaited IMF loans never materialized. The price of bread, together with other basic goods, rose and lines in front of traditional bakeries were top news.
The final straws on the economic front were electricity cuts and fuel shortages. By the beginning of June 2013, fuel shortages were common throughout Egypt. In the middle of the hot summer season, electricity was in short supply.
Lines at gas stations combined with bread lines highlighted the ineptitude of Mursi’s bureaucrats to solve the twin problems.
Brotherhood sympathizers have talked about some conspiracies to create artificial shortages in fuel and electricity, and raise prices of basic staples, but those accusations did not convince ordinary Egyptians to give Mursi and the Brotherhood another chance. By the end of June, tens of millions of Egyptians were demanding a recall of Dr. Mursi and early elections to choose his replacement.
The rise and fall of Dr. Mursi is a tragic lesson on how snatch defeat from the jaws of victory and historical opportunity.

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