In the first part of this article, which appeared yesterday, we described how President Saddam Hussein of Iraq has been able to sustain himself in power thanks to a complex strategy of bribery and brutality. Mention was also made of a series of pacts the Iraqi strongman concluded with the 60 or so tribal chiefs. These pacts are important because of large territories the chiefs control and their readiness to use weapons in the service of the regime. This is the second and concluding part:
Repression remains the central plank of Saddam’s strategy. He has rebuilt his Presidential Guard to an estimated strength of 12 divisions, including four mechanized.
Saddam’s security apparatus, including the armed forces, the police and several paramilitary corps, accounts for almost 600,000 men, roughly on par with that of Iran whose population is three times that of Iraq. Ignoring many of the normal tasks of a government, Saddam’s regime is almost exclusively focused on self-preservation.
Part of the resources comes through the oil-for-food program under which the Baghdad authorities controlled the distribution of basic necessities. A measure of Saddam Hussein’s hunger for more cash was given by the UN that, breaking diplomatic rules, leaked a report accusing the Iraqi leaders of asking for kickbacks and commissions on every contract made for imports of food and medicine.
According to US officials, Saddam Hussein has set up “a slush fund” of $8 billion to distribute favor among his supporters and to finance secret weapons programs. In September 2000 Iraq announced a special surcharge of 40 US cents on every barrel of oil extracted from its wells. The proceeds are to be deposited in Saddam Hussein slush fund.
Iraq is also widely believed to be engaged in massive smuggling activities that violate the UN resolutions. Iraq is selling an estimated 150,000 tons of diesel to Turkey through Habur a month in clear defiance of sanctions. The Barzani Kurds, who control part of the border, get a cut in exchange for allowing Saddam to by-pass the UN. Also, Iraq is smuggling an estimated 100,000 barrels of light crude oil through the Shatt al-Arab, a border river now under effective Iranian control. More openly, Iraq is supplying 14000 barrels of oil a day to a small Iranian refinery at Kermanshah close to the border. Even some Western oil companies are suspected of smuggling activities. Last year Royal Dutch Shell was fined $2 million after being found guilty of trying to smuggle oil from Iraq through the Gulf.
The past 10 years have established a pattern of behavior by Saddam Hussein. He has shown that he does not admit the outcome of the 1991 war that drove him out of Kuwait. One constant theme of his propaganda campaign is that the war is still on and that “the great goals of the Arab nation” will be attained eventually. That phrase is a code for Saddam’s dream of annexing Kuwait.
Under its cease-fire accords and its obligations toward the UN, Iraq must recognize Kuwait’s independence and territorial integrity and renounce all aggressive intentions.
A law passed to that effect by the Iraqi National Assembly (parliament), however, has not been duly ratified by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), nor has been signed by Saddam Hussein in his capacity as head of state. A sign of Saddam Hussein’s intentions came in 1998 when he massed his troops along the border with Kuwait in an attempt to intimidate the smaller Arab states of the Gulf.
He was forced to call back his military demonstration as a result of he Operation Desert Fox ordered by President Bill Clinton. That Saddam Hussein has not changed his policies either was demonstrated by the move he made in 1996 when he sent his tanks to Erbil, inside the Kurdish “safe haven” to crush one Kurdish faction in favor of another with whom he had a tactical alliance.
Whether or not the present sanctions should remain in place is a matter of legitimate debate. But the real issue is whether or not there is a need for a mechanism to contain Iraq and prevent it from destabilizing the region again.
The three permanent members of the Security Council that make occasional noises against the sanctions have so far not offered any such mechanism. The British, for their part, have tried to draw Saddam Hussein into a dialogue concerning a new system of observation and control for Iraq’s military programs in exchange for a suspension of the sanctions. Saddam Hussein, however, has seen the British move as a sign of division in the Security Council and refused to discuss anything but a full and unconditional lifting of the sanctions.
Broadly speaking three options are available in dealing with Iraq. The first is to devise a “rollback” program to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The claim, mainly by some do-gooders in the West, that Saddam has become popular as a result of the sanctions could be dismissed as a myth. In a country that lacks any mechanism for ascertaining public opinion any demonstration of support for the leader is suspect.
The second option, apparently favored by France, Russia and China, is for the UN to admit defeat and walk away from Iraq, allowing Saddam Hussein to do as he pleases. Such a policy could push Iraq out of the world headlines for a while. No one suggests that Saddam would immediately launch a new war. But the fact that he is still around and under no control would be enough to inject instability in the Gulf region.
The third option is to continue the policy of “containment”, perhaps with some modifications. A number of symbolic measures should be maintained to underline the position of the present regime in Baghdad as an international pariah.
This should include a refusal to normalize relations and restore high-level diplomatic contacts. The bank accounts controlled by the Iraqi leadership, mostly in the European Union countries, could be frozen or, at least, put under supervision. More importantly, the ban on the sale of dual use materiel and technology should remain in place.
To make sure that the ban is not breached a system must be devised to punish international companies, most of them Western, that alone are capable of providing what Iraq needs for its program of weapons of mass destruction. Fear of being prosecuted in US courts has been a powerful element in dissuading American and multinational companies from investing in Iran’s energy industries during the past five years. A similar measure could go a long way in making it difficult for Iraq to secure the international partners to rebuild its war machine. Needless to say an international ban on the sale of weapons of mass destruction to Iraq should remain in place.
