NEW DELHI, 21 May — Discord between India and Pakistan has compelled observers to give serious thought to the problems between the two nuclear powers.
The annual report of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) describes it as a “rapidly evolving test-bed for nuclear deterrence theory.” According to the report, India has the means to make 65 nuclear weapons, while Pakistan could make 39.
The IISS report also states that the search for stability between India and Pakistan was hampered by the absence of official talks in 2000.
In the opinion of Jasjit Singh, director of the Indian Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, “The nuclear policy should seek to deter rather than fight a war with nuclear weapons. India’s no first-use doctrine is a defensive doctrine that limits the use of nuclear weapons to retaliation only.”
The nuclear capacities of the two nations can only be put to two uses: — Mutual Destruction or Deterrence and to date, both have chosen the latter.
In December 1985, Rajiv Gandhi and Gen. Zia-ul Haq reached a six-point accord. According to the accord, the two nations agreed not to attack the other’s nuclear installations. Against this background, the Lahore Declaration may be regarded as a logical continuation of their earlier understanding.
If the 1985 accord had been followed by an Indo-Pak war, the accord would have no relevance. But where does the 1999 Kargil crisis fit in? It stands out as a classic illustration of the deterrent factor discouraging open conflicts and also allowing proxy wars to assume dangerous dimension.
