Hamas is eager to return to the days of direct Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Direct occupation would end the current ambiguous situation. In the opinion of Hamas, the present Palestinian situation is neither occupation nor independence. Palestine is not a proper state but a wounded and disfigured entity with the facade of a parliament, a president, a flag, a national anthem, an intelligence service and an honor guard for visiting dignitaries.
Hamas would prefer a return to direct occupation that could produce a struggle and a liberation war for an independent and sovereign Palestinian state. In any future struggle, Hamas would not look for a liberator or a hero from outside Palestine but would depend solely on the support of the Palestinian people. Any support that might come from the Arab and Islamic world would be complementary to its resources but would never be taken for granted or depended upon. I believe this to be not only the strategy of Hamas but also that of other Palestinian national movements that are determined to resist and oppose the Oslo Accord.
I am not making these assertions on the basis of any information I obtained from Hamas members; nor have I seen any secret document or plan. My impression is the result of listening to, and analyzing, what I hear from public statements by Hamas. I am certain that if someone were to ask a Hamas activist about what I have written, he might call my ideas speculation.
The Jerusalem bombing in which a number of Israelis were killed was meant as a provocation to Sharon and his thugs.
Abdul Aziz Al-Rentisi, the third man in Hamas, made it worse when he was on TV. He challenged Sharon and the Israelis to be man enough for a face-to-face confrontation with the Palestinians, rather than conducting a long-distance war with US-made Apache helicopters or the latest version of F-16s.
However, it is doubtful if the strategy of provocation would work. Hamas, obviously, is betting on Sharon’s stupidity. Of course, the man has enough of that. He thinks not with his mind but with his might — just like a street thug. We know the kind; we have our own in the Arab world. It was not such a long time ago that we all had a chance to know one from experience. As leaders, they all are failures and can be depended on to act stupid.
The problem with the plan is that, if it is to succeed, Sharon has to rise to the bait. But, unfortunately for Hamas strategists, Sharon does not rule Israel by himself. Before he could react, someone in Israel or the US who would ask him the obvious question. “If you reoccupy the West Bank and Gaza and destroy the Palestinian Authority, who will you put pressure on and from whom will you ask assistance in arresting terrorists?”
We all realize, as Hamas surely must, that if Sharon chooses to depend on his military might — or is provoked by Hamas to use it — the Palestinians will pay dearly in terms of lives and property. The present number of 600 martyrs in the current intifada would surely be increased many times. I am not prophesying, but making a simple comparison with other national liberation movements such as those in Algeria, Vietnam or Bosnia. For the record, the struggle in Bosnia has claimed more than 150,000 victims during three years of war — which equal eight percent of the total Muslim population.
Any analysis of the Palestinian situation must take into account one significant factor that sets it apart from all other national liberation movements. It is that throughout the history of the struggle, all crucial decisions affecting the fate of the nation and the people were taken outside the country. This makes it unique. It began in 1936, when the Palestinians committed a great mistake in obeying the Arab leaders who called for an end to the struggle — which is called in Arabic “The Great Revolution”. Since that time, the Palestinian diplomatic struggle has been outside Palestine.
One of the main reasons for the first intifada, in 1988, was that the Palestinians in Palestine had grown tired of waiting for a hero from outside. They were frustrated that no Arab army was moving to liberate their land and that what little remained of Jerusalem had also been occupied. What should have been the Palestinian army had vanished in wars in Jordan and Lebanon and ended up as small groups, scattered here and there.
While these things were going on, the other Arabs were, of course, too busy to involve themselves with the struggle of their Palestinian brothers. They were far too busy with their own insoluble inter-Arab quarrels and other trivial nonsense. The Palestinians thus had no choice but to fall back on the conventional wisdom — “If you want something done, do it yourself.”
And so, the intifada was born out of helpless fury, and it became the means both of horrifying the Israelis and returning the Palestinian issue to the spotlight. This lasted until the biggest Arab sin of the decade, the invasion of Kuwait, which was followed by another misdeed, with equally serious consequences — the Oslo Accord.
While speeches were given, hands were shaken, and signing ceremonies held, the issue of Palestine seemed to go on hold for the better part of a decade - for the same old reason: once again it had returned to the hands of outsiders. Ironically, the Palestinian leadership handed over all cards to Washington: The enemy had become the arbitrator.
Finally, today, 65 years after the Great Revolution of 1936, the Palestinian issue, the struggle and the leadership have returned to Palestine. This is a historic opportunity for them.
Oslo is, at the same time, a historic opportunity for the Israelis and it is one they will hang onto and exploit to the fullest. The Palestinian Authority will remain where it is, to fulfil its Oslo-designed role in the future. The real “wise men” of Israel — Shimon Peres, Martin Indyk and George Bush Jr. — rather than such fools as Sharon, Netanyahu and Lieberman will defend its existence.
Bur after a while, all these “wise men” may realize that the game has slipped out of their hands — that the Palestinian issue has gone home — to Palestine.
