With the war against terrorism gathering momentum, a number of governments are being forced to review many of their policies. Turkey is one among them. It suddenly finds itself with a wide range of concerns, almost all of which could bring about major changes in the republic’s future. There is a growing conviction in Ankara that Saddam Hussain’s Iraq will be the second item on the US target list.
Despite Washington’s displeasure, Ankara last year upgraded its diplomatic presence in Baghdad to ambassador level and has deepened its relations with the Iraqi dictatorship. Saddam is happy with anyone who is prepared to help break Iraq’s isolation, even if that country is one which is also hosting hostile warplanes. The cautious rapprochement with Iraq is a reflection of its worries that were the country to lose strong central leadership, it would break up and a powerful autonomous Kurdish state would emerge on Turkey’s southeastern border. Under Ottoman rule, Iraq was made up of the three provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul in the north. In 1928, the new Turkish republic was reluctant to endorse the attachment of the oil-rich Mosul province to the new kingdom of Iraq. However, Ataturk rated his internal reform agenda more important than further international conflict.
But two developments are obliging Ankara to review its concern over an independent Kurdish state on their border. The first is the fact that if Turkey wishes to stand a chance of becoming a member of the European Union, it must embrace fundamental changes to its stance on human rights and the right of ethnic minorities within its borders. Hence the current debate in the Turkish Parliament on 37 amendments to the 1980 constitution, which would bring the country more into line with its intended European partners.
The most far-reaching effect of these changes, if they are passed, will be to give recognition to the language and culture of the 12 million Kurds within the republic. The majority of Turkish Kurds were long content to live under Turkish rule. Repressive behavior by the Turkish military during the long and bitter campaign against the PKK however made more enemies than friends. But it may not be too late to defuse that anger and resentment. Properly implemented constitutional change could rob the PKK much of its support among a war-weary Kurdish population. With a contented Kurdish population domestically, Turkey would have far less to fear from the breakup of Iraq and the emergence of a strong Kurdish state. Indeed, if central government in Baghdad did collapse, Turkey could benefit via its own Kurds from trade and oil production with the old province of Mosul.
The second, and indeed more pressing, development which is driving most of these developments is Turkey’s parlous financial position. It is yet again being bailed out by the IMF after failed economic reforms, because successive governments shied away from the massive job losses consequent upon radical privatization. At best, Washington could underwrite new investments to create tens of thousands of new jobs; at worst, it could oblige the IMF to go easy on the Ecevit government, over its fear of implementing genuine reforms.
