Iraq’s decision to back down over arms inspectors and allow them back on without conditions will be regarded by many as a crafty move by a wily tactician intent on by spinning out the process and throwing American strategy into difficulties.
Without doubt, that is precisely what was in Saddam Hussein’s mind. But equally, there can be no doubt that he would not have moved even this far had it not become blindingly clear that after the US decided to go down the UN route, the international community had closed ranks behind it and was intent on passing a UN ultimatum demanding the inspectors’ return. The Saudi announcement that it would cooperate in any action approved by the United Nations further added to the pressure on Baghdad. Saddam’s retreat is proof that he has at last become convinced that he is now standing alone, truly and honestly alone, facing the possibility of finding himself against the entire international community
But this is not the end of the story, merely the end of a chapter. Despite comments by the Russian prime minister that Iraq’s climb down makes a UN resolution unnecessary, Washington will still push for, and get, an ultimatum spelling out a timetable and requiring Iraq’s total acquiescence. The fear is that without such a resolution, Saddam will delay, procrastinate and give the arms inspectors the general runaround as he did before. He will probably do that anyway despite being confronted with an ultimatum; he cannot afford the inspectors to dig too deeply. Even now it is unclear if his agreement to allow them back in “without conditions” refers to them being permitted back as and when they want or, once in, their being allowed to go where they want, whenever they want.
For Saddam, this seems to be the last chance. The international community is not going to allow him any further twists and turns. The inspectors will pull out the first minute they find their path impeded. That will then move the confrontation back to brinkmanship, with the US again insisting on military action.
Yet for all this skeptical, but thoroughly realistic, view of what Iraq is going to do, the fact remains that it has made a climb down. The ought to be grabbed by the UN and turned back on Iraq. Rather than simply limit the argument to one about arms inspectors, the UN should increase its demands on Iraq. There are many other promises that Baghdad has not kept.
The international community’s opposition to unilateral action by the United States did never mean an endorsement of Iraq’s refusal to deliver on the commitments it made in the cease-fire agreement. These should be incorporated into any resolution on Iraq. It should not just be about weapons of mass destruction; it ought to take into account the interests of the Iraq people. If there are arms inspections, why not also demand inspections of Iraqi prisons to see what is going on there — and, maybe, find the missing Kuwaitis?
The Iraqi regime will, of course, resist such demands but at least the international community will have put the wider moral case for change in Iraq — change that not only removes a major threat to regional and international peace but also brings freedom and security to Iraqis as well.
