Like the Cheshire cat that leaves behind a grin when it disappears, what is known as France’s Arab policy (Politique Arabe de France or PAF) has had a way of putting in periodic appearances during the past three decades.
PAF’s latest appearance came in the shape of the campaign that President Jacques Chirac began to wage from May 2003 to prevent or at least delay as long as possible the overthrow of the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. The French leader’s behavior, seen as “reckless” by some of his critics, is not motivated by his old friendship with the Iraqi leader, dating back to 1975.
Chirac sought Saddam’s friendship not out of personal sympathy but in the framework of a political vision. That vision is part of the legacy left by the late Gen. Charles de Gaulle, who believed that France should counterbalance the German weight in Europe, and the Anglo-American axis across the Atlantic, with a Mediterranean “profondeur” (depth) that, in practice, means a special relationship with the Arab states of North Africa and the Middle East.
Chirac established himself as a promoter of PAF during his first term as prime minister (1974-76) during which he visited 11 Arab capitals and played host to 14 Arab heads, setting a record. He also signed contracts worth billions of dollars with various Arab states, including one that gave Iraq its first nuclear center, Osirak, which launched Saddam’s nuclear weapons program.
As already noted, PAF was initially introduced by de Gaulle in 1967 after the June war in which Israel defeated the Arab states and ended up in control of vast chunks of Arab territory including East Jerusalem. In 1967, de Gaulle, no longer hamstrung by the Algerian war, and having scaled down the special relationship with Israel, was in a position to launch PAF with panache. PAF started as a series of diplomatic moves and political declarations, like the one describing the Jews as “un peuple sur de lui et dominateur” (a people sure of itself and domineering), that some critics saw as anti-Semitic.
The general also imposed an embargo on the sale of French arms to all belligerents in the Middle East. Since there were no Arab states among the customers of the French armament industry at the time, the ban concerned only Israel, which at the time depended on French hardware.
De Gaulle might not have realized it at the time, but his launching of PAF accelerated the “ Americanization” of Israel. Conscious that, without a big-power ally, its existence could be in danger, Israel was almost obliged to turn to the United States in search of the same kind of special relationship that France was now terminating.
A certain resentment of the United States, in the context of a complex love-hate relationship, has always affected a section of the French ruling establishment. Gaullism sought to give expression to that resentment in a number of ways, including withdrawal from the military command of NATO in 1966.
One aim of PAF was, one must assume, the securing of a greater share for French goods in the Arab markets. But that has not happened. In most Arab countries France has been outdistanced as a trading partner by Germany, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In a sense, PAF may have actually harmed French business prospects. There is a feeling in many Arab countries that doing business with France is always political rather than commercial, and that one must purchase French goods and services not because they are attractive but as part of a pay-off for French political support.
Chirac had to abandon PAF when his party lost control of the parliament in the 1997 elections. The period of “cohabitation” with a Socialist prime minister left Chirac with few opportunities to shape foreign policy.
Having won back a majority in the parliament in 2002, Chirac lost no time to regain control of foreign policy, and appointed his former bureau chief Dominique de Villepin, an amateur poet, as foreign minister. Within weeks, PAF was up and running again. It announced its revival not only via the new pro-Saddam policy but also with a series of high-level visits, new contracts and aid packages.
The latest eruption of PAF may prove costly for France, and a debate on PAF may become unavoidable. Such a debate would have to start with a critical assessment of the assumption that there is a single, monolithic Arab entity with which France could maintain and develop relations.
The diversity of the countries grouped together under the label of “the Arab world” renders any attempt at dealing with them on the basis of a “grand design”, inoperative.
Arab News Opinion 21 March 2003
