The decision by Turkey’s former PKK — which now calls itself Kadek (The Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan) — to abandon its four-year unilateral cease-fire is wrong.
Now is not the time for any Middle Eastern minority with a grievance to revert to violence, and it is especially ill-timed for Turkey’s Kurds. The wheels of a peaceful resolution may have been grinding slowly, but a compromise solution for Kurdish demands has been emerging, along with it a strengthening of the Kurdish negotiating position. The cease-fire was originally declared in February 1999 following the arrest of the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan. Since then the Kurdish hand has been strengthening as outside bodies such as the European Union have lent their good offices in search of a lasting solution.
The Turkish authorities began to move toward a negotiated settlement. The Turkish Parliament has passed laws reversing the foolish bans on Kurdish culture. That these laws may not have gone far enough nor been enacted fulsomely is another issue. The fact remains that a course was plotted for an end to this appalling 15-year conflict which cost the lives of at least 30,000 people and imposed a serious drain on the Turkish budget. As ever, there are hard-liners on both sides who will seize any opportunity to stir up old enmities. The decision last March of the Turkish High Court to ban the People’s Democracy Party because of its links to the PKK caused anger among Kurds, despite the fact that foreign observers sympathized with the court’s decision. Against this, in July the Turkish Parliament voted a partial amnesty for PKK terrorists. Given that last March the European Court of Human Rights handed down a ruling that the trial of Ocalan had not been conducted fairly, it seems likely that any future trials of PKK or Kadek leaders will be subject to considerable international scrutiny.
From this complex and volatile situation was taking shape a way in which Kurdish demands could be accommodated. Wise men among the Kurdish political leadership may have argued that the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish region in occupied northern Iraq was concentrating political minds in Ankara. The danger of a link-up between Iraqi Kurds and Turkey’s own Kurdish population may well have been propelling moderate Turkish politicians toward an early and far-reaching settlement.
Now the moderates on both sides have been left high and dry. The influential Turkish military is eager to resume the full-blown conflict which they believed they were winning when Ocalan was captured. Meanwhile Kadek hard-liners clearly think that with Iraqi Kurdish support they can seriously improve their bargaining position. Both sides are wrong, but unless there is a rapid rethink it will take the shedding of a lot more blood to prove it.
