MOSCOW, 22 November 2003 — When campaigning for seats in Russia’s lower Parliament chamber, or State Duma, began weeks ago, voters and politicians paid little attention. What, many grumbled, could be more predictable?
President Vladimir V. Putin was firmly in control of Russia’s national legislature. The Dec. 7 elections seemed likely to confirm the status quo. Then, on Oct. 25, prosecutors arrested political dissident Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, top shareholder in the oil giant Yukos, accusing him of swindling the government out of $1 billion.
Now, politicians and parties are struggling to define themselves. Pro-business politicians find themselves criticizing big corporations. Liberal democrats are defending tycoons.
“It looks like the election will be much more interesting now,’’ said Sergei Kalmykov, head of the Moscow-based Development of Parliament Foundation.
What is not clear is what permanent changes, if any, the turmoil might bring.
Russia’s relatively feeble Parliament has long been a standing political joke for voters, a labyrinth of intrigue for analysts and a source of immunity from criminal prosecution for some of its members.
But for most of its 10 years of existence, the Duma — its name is derived from the Russian word for “to think’’ — has mainly served as a forum for Russia’s disgruntled to vent frustration. After Putin came to power four years ago, the Kremlin gradually imposed discipline. Dissenting voices grew fewer and fainter.
Yeltsin might have welcomed apathy. He faced opposition-dominated Parliaments throughout the 1990s, occasionally resorting to rule by decree or tank assaults to impose reforms. But his successor, Putin, has tamed the legislative beast through what political observers here call “managed democracy.’’
Mostly, this means managed elections. To this end, the Kremlin indirectly controls news coverage on all three television networks. Courts and election boards routinely disqualify maverick candidates on technical grounds. Prominent troublemakers drop out of politics to take Kremlin posts.
Some analysts think Khodorkovsky’s arrest resulted from a power struggle between two shadowy Kremlin factions or “clans.’’ On one side are former KGB and military officials, called the siloviki, who are suspicious of the West and hostile to Russia’s wealthy oligarchs. On the other are members of “the family,’’ holdovers from the Yeltsin administration, who are generally pro-Western and pro-market.
Some political leaders hope Khodorkovsky’s arrest will inspire fresh support for democratic reforms. Russians now recognize that the Kremlin is moving “in the direction of a repressive regime,’’ said candidate Viktor Sheinis, 72, a prominent Soviet-era dissident.
But opinion polls suggest that most Russians support the crackdown on Yukos. Even those opposed to the Kremlin’s actions might not be inspired to turn out Dec. 7.
