In “Present at the Creation”, his classic account of American statecraft, Dean Acheson reflects on the gap between illusion and policy. On the one hand, there are the grand expectations of the visionary: eternal peace, universal freedom, a world respecting basic human rights. On the other, there are the complexities of history, the stubborn imperfections of mankind and the hard facts of power and its limits.
The Bush administration — and like it or not the United States as a whole — is suspended somewhere between these two poles.
In Iraq, the administration grapples with the perplexing, prosaic aftermath of an ostensibly historic victory that has produced not peace but more war. Adding the unfinished business of Afghanistan to the mix, the price tag comes to a reported $5 billion per month. American casualties continue to mount, and US forces are stretched to the breaking point.
Signs of progress — such as the welcome capture of Saddam Hussein — are offset by almost daily reminders that the occupiers are unable to meet even their most basic obligation, namely, to protect the Iraqi people from a campaign of terror brought on by US actions. As never before, the world views the United States with suspicion and mistrust.
Having gotten itself into a mess, the Bush administration has responded pragmatically. It has lowered expectations, accelerated its timetable for restoring Iraqi sovereignty and backed away from the strident our-way-or-the-highway attitude that prevailed through the first half of 2003. With its newly unveiled initiative for nurturing liberal tendencies in the Middle East, it has seemingly abandoned the notion that the most efficacious instrument for promoting political change is the point of a bayonet. It has sought to mend diplomatic fences.
This is all to the good and suggests that the myths conjured up a year ago to jolly Americans into endorsing a preventive war — chief among those myths the cakewalk theory and its corollary, the self-funding occupation — are at last giving way to an approach grounded in realism.
But as the Bush administration finally gets around to forging a policy, it is essential to drive a stake through the preposterous illusions that got us here in the first place.
First, the illusion that the “end of history” is at hand, needing only a gentle nudge from the United States to bring humankind to its prescribed destination, to wit, a world that adheres to the norms of American-style democratic capitalism. Events in Iraq provide daily reminders that history still has mysteries and surprises to spare. The expectations of our own ideologues notwithstanding, the world is not eager to remake itself in America’s own image. Nor should it be.
Second, the illusion that wherever the United States leads, others will be quick to follow. The Iraq misadventure demolished that notion and left the United States not only isolated but viewed in some quarters as a bigger problem than Saddam Hussein’s Iraq ever was. No doubt, in some sense, the world needs the United States to exercise global leadership, but in an equally real sense, to lead effectively the United States needs the active support of allies.
Third, the illusion that in an information age, military power, at least as employed by Washington, has become something of an all-purpose problem solver. Iraq has amply demonstrated the limits of “shock and awe.”
Fourth, the illusion that the world’s sole superpower has reserves of power to spare. It doesn’t, not militarily, not financially and not morally. Iraq has shown how narrow the margin is between global hegemony and imperial overstretch. Notably, the cause of Iraqi liberation has not evoked any discernible American enthusiasm for coughing up more tax dollars or more recruits. We want to win. But don’t expect us to sacrifice.
It is too much to expect Bush to openly renounce these illusions. But he would do well to let Americans know, even if indirectly, that he has learned his lessons. Otherwise Americans might do well to choose as president someone who will not oblige the rest of us to foot the bill for his continuing education.
— Bacevich, a professor of international relations at Boston University, is currently a fellow at the American Academy in Berlin.
