With peace talks between the interim Iraqi government and a delegation of Fallujah citizens at a dead-end, the long-promised military assault on the rebel town appears imminent. The mini-battles in which eight American Marines died and nine more were injured yesterday may well be the overture to larger air and land attacks on both Fallujah and its sister city Ramadi. During an official visit to Kuwait yesterday, Iraq’s interim President Ghazi Al-Yawar told reporters that establishing governmental authority in Fallujah, Ramadi and two or three other cities still controlled by the insurgency was a sine qua non for holding free and fair elections throughout the country next January. Yawar is right. The idea that several cities, indeed the whole of the so-called “Sunni Triangle,” could be scripted out of the planned elections has never been acceptable to Iraqis of any religious or ethnic group. But even at this late stage, it is important to ask whether the use of force is the best, let alone the sole, option available to the interim government in whose names the coming assaults will take place.
To brand all rebels in Fallujah, Ramadi and other parts of the “Sunni Triangle” terrorists is both naïve and dangerous. The fact is that the interim government and its US-led backers face three distinct types of insurgency. The first consists of members of Saddam’s disbanded army who, having lost all means of earning a living, have found a new occupation and a modicum of dignity in rebellion. In some cases, these ex-soldiers lost the houses that went with their positions in Saddam’s army. Many of those houses have been requisitioned by the American troops and their hangers-on. It does not require great genius to realize that this group of rebels could be drawn into meaningful negotiations aimed at understanding and, when proper, meeting their grievances.
The second circle of insurgency consists of desperadoes from various paramilitary organizations set up by Saddam and his sons as instruments of political terror. Even these elements could be led back into normal life and given a place in a new Iraq that will belong to all its citizens. Finally, we have the non-Iraqi terrorists who have come from different countries to indulge in terrorism in the name of their perverted ideologies. These elements must be isolated and eliminated. But in order to do so, one must remove the human shields provided for them by the two other groups and, to a lesser extent, the ordinary citizens of Fallujah and Ramadi.
What is needed are tact, patience and diplomacy of the kind used to bring an end to the Sadrist rebellion in Najaf and Sadr City just a few weeks ago. With the American presidential election just days away, there will be no domestic US political reasons for using the iron fist in Fallujah or Ramadi. Regardless of who wins the American election, the interim Iraqi government must exercise greater authority in deciding when and where force should be used. The iron fist could of course produce military victory but what the interim government needs is something else — political victory.
