Between India and Pakistan the reality check got going. President Parvez Musharraf’s recent invitation to the Pakistani media to think “outside the box” evoked the unexpected categorical and public response that no redrawing of borders was possible. While Pakistan-Indian interaction indicates that neither wants a breakdown in the process of normalization and is going ahead with CBMs.
Yet the frank exchanges between the top leadership and the bureaucrats do establish four significant elements that constitute the present context of the Kashmir dispute. The first is India’s Kashmir policy. Delhi’s three-plank solution rests on providing development funds to the J & K government, to enter into conditional dialogue with Kashmiris willing to “lay down their arms” and to seek Pakistan’s cooperation to continue with its twin pillar policy on Kashmir — the conversion of the LOC into an international border and pursuing the internal track to a political settlement within the Indian Union. Delhi hopes to allow greater inter-Kashmiri interaction within the Indian Union framework, hence its emphasis on using the Indian passports as identification if not travel documents. The recently unveiled 9-point Delhi Strategy on Jammu and Kashmir reiterates Delhi’s already nonworkable approach on Kashmir.
Verbally the Indian commitment to resolving Kashmir, according to the Indian foreign secretary, is “not looking at territorial solutions; ours is a people-centered approach. We are looking at how we can somehow ameliorate the negative consequences of the lines which have been put on the map.” This implies blurring the LOC but in effect the first test of this intent will come with India’s position on the travel documents for the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service.
The second important element of the context is the position of the Kashmiris. The entire APHC leadership, the United Jihad Council and the Kashmiri opinion reflected in the Kashmir Valley newspapers is that majority of Kashmiris are overwhelmingly alienated from the Indian state. Privately and publicly the Kashmiri leadership is seeking unconditional dialogue with India, repeal of acts that severely violate the Kashmiri freedom of movement, demand significant withdrawal of around 700,000 military and paramilitary forces deployed by Delhi, a three-track Delhi-Islamabad-Kashmiri dialogue, interaction between Kashmiris along the LOC. They want the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service but without using Indian passports as travel or identification documents.
The third important element is Pakistan’s own position on Kashmir. Pakistan remains committed to dialogue and political engagement as the primary tools for resolving the Kashmir dispute. No solution that converts the LOC into an international border, as a border and no unilateral flexibility; no to facilitating Delhi-APHC talks without an assured quid pro quo from Delhi which could include removing travel restrictions from the APHC so they could meet their Pakistani counterparts, yes to cross-LOC Kashmiri interaction and no to any travel-related documentation that implies recognition of the LOC as a boundary or the Kashmiris as Indian nationals.
For now Islamabad has opted for bilateralism over multilateralism as the medium for seeking a political solution. The thrust of the Kashmir policy is to attack the logjam from every angle, to somehow break the diplomatic deadlock that remains despite all the normalization and CBM efforts. Hence Musharraf’s suggestion to look at possibilities like joint control and the UN mandate are mere attempts to get the discussion going.
Fourth important element that is influencing the context within which a solution can be sought is the role of the Indian media. For now it overwhelmingly follows the Indian state’s “truth” on Jammu and Kashmir. Unlike their commendable role on picking holes in state “truths” on domestic matters on Kashmir the media refuses to engage with the historical as well as the present facts.
Indeed the overwhelming majority seeks good relations with India and is in favor of enhancing people-to-people contacts — but not at the expense of abandoning the Kashmiris while supporting president Musharraf’s flexible approach to finding a viable solution. Flowing from this current context are the new and old linkages that are emerging: Pakistan’s linkage of the MFN status to India with Indian relaxation of trade barriers plus progress on Kashmir. India has now linked the Iran-Pakistan-Indian gas pipeline to Pakistan granting it the MFN status.
Against this backdrop seeking any solution to Kashmir would be premature.
While efforts at bilateral normalization must continue the only positive development that can take place on the Kashmir front that would also reduce the suffering and insecurity of the Kashmiris is the unification of the Kashmiris. In accordance to the Kashmiri demands the first step toward this unification should be the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service. Greater interaction between Kashmiris will give them greater strength and coordination to tackle their immediate as well as long-term disputes with India.
