Will the US capitulate for a third time?

In the confrontation between the US and Iran there will be a winner and a loser, and all the options are difficult: the dilemma effectively is between capitulation and escalation. In the past, Washington capitulated, twice. What might be different this time?

The US avoided a full-on confrontation with Iran in both 1983-84 and 2006. There were two factors that helped at those times but they are no longer present. The major one was that in the US, perhaps people would listen to reason back then. In a game of chicken, where he who hesitates first loses, that is a big disadvantage.

Equally important was the fact that the region’s multiple conflicts were seen as unrelated. There was Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel-Palestine, Yemen and Iran. In the case of Iran, the nuclear issue was also viewed as distinct. Each problem could be dealt with separately, and if one got too hot it could be contained or postponed; there were always other priorities and internal politics would intervene.

Let us set aside the idea of listening to reason for now. The major change is that the confrontation is now directly with Iran. The art of war is to keep the fighting out of your own territory. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps did that brilliantly before, through the use of proxy militias in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and they had what more-sophisticated analysts would call plausible deniability.

There were always “experts” in Washington who denied the connections between Iran and its proxies, like when the Houthis took over in Yemen. But after Oct. 7, Iran’s regional strategy became too obvious even for them to question. The Revolutionary Guard overplayed its hand by moving all its assets in coordination at the same time: Hamas attacked Israel, followed by Hezbollah, then the Houthis and the Iraqi militias, and then the IRGC chipped in with a test run.

What, then, of the previous two instances when the US ultimately listened to the voice of reason and compromised with Iran?

Round one of the Iran-US confrontation took place in 1984 and ended with Washington’s capitulation. This was in the aftermath of Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon to get rid of the Palestine Liberation Organization. 

As long as the IRGC has the ability to launch a few drones or missiles, it can still paralyze global trade routes and energy markets.

Nadim Shehadi

After the US embassy and marine barracks in the country were bombed, on orders from Tehran, President Ronald Reagan ordered US troops to “redeploy” elsewhere, which left a vacuum in Lebanon that was filled by Syria and Iran, eventually leading to the rise of Hezbollah.

The Assad regime in Syria, then an ally of Iran against Iraq, was engaged and given a free hand in Lebanon, especially when Syrian help was needed during the first Gulf War to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. In other words, in order to help liberate Kuwait from a tyrannical dictatorship, another small country, Lebanon, was sacrificed to another dictator. Part of that deal was that there would be no mention of Syria’s role in the country.

The Syrian occupation of Lebanon was further legitimized by another occupation: the Israeli Security Zone in southern Lebanon. Under this “Pax Syriana,” Hezbollah flourished as a resistance against Israel’s occupation. When the Israelis withdrew in 2000, however, Lebanese voices started to call for a Syrian withdrawal and the disarming of Hezbollah. When the Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, joined these calls he was assassinated in 2005, leading to a revolt and Syrian withdrawal.

The second round of the Iran-US confrontation began in the summer of 2006 and led to another capitulation, via Syria, when things became too hot for the US after another regional confrontation with Iran.

It started in Gaza on June 25. Elements from Hamas or Islamic Jihad crossed the border and abducted an Israeli soldier by the name of Gilad Shalit. They then retreated and started firing rockets, igniting the Gaza front. Just over two weeks later, on July 12, members of Hezbollah did the same: They crossed the border, captured two Israeli soldiers and then started firing rockets, triggering the second Lebanon War.

Barely a month later, violence in Iraq multiplied exponentially, with Syria and Iran sending militants across the border to help. The region was on fire and in no time at all, voices of reason in Washington declared defeat.

Internal US politics intervened when the speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, and Senator John Kerry traveled to Damascus to engage in talks with President Bashar Assad, who was being threatened by US President George W. Bush. This was even while multiple political assassinations in Lebanon were happening.

By the time President Barack Obama moved into the White House in January 2009, a date had been set for the US withdrawal from Iraq. Assad dangled the carrot of negotiations with Israel and, from a US perspective, all was going well — until the Arab Spring intervened beginning in 2010.

There was again talk of a “Grand Bargain” in which Iran would offer to help extinguish the fires it had started, and Obama hinted at the country’s rightful role in the region. Arab allies of the US had good reason to worry, especially when they were not included in the negotiations that in 2015 led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal. 

Israel and the US have already been defeated: they have no strategy, no end game, are desperately looking for an off ramp.

Nadim Shehadi

When the US accepted as a condition of the negotiations that Iran’s regional role would not be discussed, it amounted to giving Tehran a free hand to intervene in the region. Hamas and Hezbollah were also given a huge boost when they exchanged captives they held, or their bodies, for hundreds of prisoners; less than 10 years later, they were in control of Gaza and Lebanon.

All this came to a head on Oct. 7, 2023, when Iran and its proxies launched their simultaneous regional attacks, starting with Gaza, then in Lebanon, then Iraq, then Yemen.

We are now in the middle of a full-on round three of the Iran-US confrontation and everyone is on edge. To the Trump administration, this could mean either more attacks on Tehran or, once again, capitulation — or in the new vocabulary, “making a deal.”

To anyone who reads Gideon Rachman in the Financial Times, or Javad Zarif in Foreign Affairs or many other experts and analysts, the message is clear: Israel and the US have already been defeated: they have no strategy, no end game, are desperately looking for an off ramp and they need to surrender or face global disaster. Tehran will give them good terms.

There may be some truth to the suggestion that mere survival will constitute victory for the IRGC and its proxies, whereas their opponents, primarily the US, have to achieve all of their strategic objectives. This is not an inoffensive and harmless observation, and it shows that the stakes are now much too high for any compromise, especially by the Arab states and other allies of the US.

The bottom line is that as long as the IRGC has the ability to launch a few drones or missiles, it can still paralyze global trade routes and energy markets by blocking the Strait of Hormuz.

The message from Iran to its Gulf neighbors is that they are exposed and no one can protect them.

Perhaps the Iranian regime’s vision of its neighbors is similar to that of the former Soviet Union and the hold it had over Eastern Europe during the Cold War.

For all of these reasons, capitulation should not be an option; this should be the last war with Iran.

• Nadim Shehadi is an economist and political adviser.

X: @Confusezeus