When in 1964 China first tested a nuclear weapon the West had every reason to be worried.
Here was a country that had recently fought the US in Korea, had threatened countries as far afield as India and Indonesia and which supported revolutionary movements all over the Third World.
But today China’s policies of would-be military domination worry us very little. Its nuclear arsenal is rather small — a mere 24 intercontinental nuclear missiles that are able to reach the US; no aircraft carrier battle groups for projecting its power; very few destroyers; it is constructing no long-range bombers; and has no military bases abroad.
Its seventy submarines rarely venture outside Chinese territorial waters. Even vis-a-vis Taiwan, against which it has deployed 600 short-range missiles, it does not have the makings of an invasion force that could overwhelm Taiwan’s defenses.
Nevertheless, both the White House and majority opinion in Congress, continue to act as if the US must contain China militarily, even while professing engagement.
In Tokyo recently, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asked to defend the presence of such a large number of US troops in Okinawa replied that they were there to balance the rise of China. Chicago professor, John Mearsheimer, America’s most influential balance of power theorist, argues, “China cannot rise peacefully” and there is “considerable potential for war”
The assumption seems to be that as the economic juggernaut continues to roll this must in the long run turn into a military threat. But it simply does not follow that an increase in China’s regional power and influence need translate into a reciprocal decrease in US power and influence. Neither power nor wealth is baked only in one size. The cake can grow for both. It is not a zero-sum game whereby my big slice is less for you.
Why Washington feels that the US long time presence in East Asia is threatened by China owes more to paranoia than good sense. Often overlooked is what Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan clearly told Secretary of State Colin Powell, that China “welcomes the America presence in the Asia-Pacific region as a stabilizing factor”.
It is six years since the late Gerald Segal published his much-discussed article in Foreign Affairs: “Does China matter?” The essentials of many of his arguments have not really changed. China’s success has been grossly overhyped.
China still accounts for only a small proportion of world trade and even in its region the latest figures show that China is a long way from dominating East Asian trade. Total regional imports from China are about 9 percent compared with Japan’s 17% and the US’s 18 percent. Although Germany is Europe’s biggest exporter to China its exports there are only 7 percent of its total.
The apparent high inflow of foreign investment into China is used to trumpet China as the wave of the future. But most of that inflow comes from ethnic Chinese and much of the so-called investment from East Asia makes a trip from China via places like Hong Kong and then comes back as foreign investment to attract tax concessions.
China, unlike India, still does not yet have enough ingredients for long-run success. It does not have any world-class companies of its own. Its legal framework is rickety and there is no guarantee that a dictatorial political system will have the flexibility to contain the stresses and strains of economic expansion pursued at the current rate of knots. In terms of literature, films or the arts in general China is overshadowed by much smaller Chinese communities — in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore.
It is probably only a matter of time before the faddish fascination with China switches to booming India and once it does it is unlikely ever to switch back again once investors realize what it is to have a haven where the law does work, albeit too slowly, and democratically elected politicians are not just accountable, but persuadable and approachable.
When it comes to China, time is on Washington’s side and the time should be used to engage China further, not to fear it or aggressively seek to counter it. That said, it will be always important to stand up for Taiwan’s democracy and not to brush under the carpet the memories of Tiananman Square. Maintaining the arms embargo and pushing Europe to do the same sends the message that the US is not setting aside any important principles. All the more strange, then, is the inexplicable contradiction to its otherwise too tough China policy: The US has recently given notice that, unlike in recent years, it is dropping its policy of voting to criticize China at the UN Human Rights Commission.
