To the uncritical eye, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas looks like an ordinary statesman presiding over an equally ordinary political reality.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
As I disinterestedly watched Abbas accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin during the latter’s “historic” visit to Ramallah in the West Bank on April 29, I was harassed by this disconcerting thought: No matter what path of politics Abbas chooses, his efforts are doomed.
There are several ideas that ought to be pondered. The focal idea deals with Abbas himself, his legitimacy and political credibility as a leader. Other ideas examine his political surroundings, the internal and external pressures and balances of power.
Unlike late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Abbas lacks legitimacy.
Worse, since the eruption of the Palestinian uprising in September 2000, Abbas and a small clique of individuals within the ranks of the Palestinian Authority (PA) were utterly clear in their objection to the popular uprising. Their doubts created disunity and threatened to transform the theoretical clash into a physical one. That possibility cannot be dismissed even today.
Left to fight and die alone for nearly five years, the Palestinian people are browbeaten and fatigued. The fact is Palestinians are not fond of Abbas; they simply see him as a last resort and frankly a dignified way out, even if temporarily.
The man has the reputation of being too flexible on issues that cannot be subject to bargain; the right of return of Palestinian refugees being one.
Abbas’ dilemma hardly ends here. It barely begins. The urgent yet difficult question to answer is: How can Abbas adhere to Palestinian expectations of full sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, the removal of Israeli settlements to the last one, among others, at a time when the envisaged peace scenario by the United States and Israel violates these demands to the last one?
In fact, the Palestinian prerequisite for a just and lasting peace seems almost entirely different from the Israeli and American interpretation. Ariel Sharon and the Bush administration are insistent in their disregard for the principal understanding of the roots of the conflict — as defined by international law — being the illegal Israeli confiscation and occupation of Palestinian land.
For Sharon, the occupation is a nonissue, for according to his perverse reasoning, Palestinians are in fact the intruders on the biblically promised land of Israel. If he wishes to evacuate a few settlements from Gaza, the motivations are decidedly strategic, and have to do more with demographics than moral imperatives. For Bush, on the other hand, it is all about Israel’s security, and how his continuous support for Israel shall ensure the patronage of Israel’s very influential friends in the Congress, lobby groups and among media pundits.
Abbas understands that his days as a statesman will last as long as Sharon will have no convincing reason to render him “irrelevant” as he did with Arafat or take him out of the political equation altogether as he did to hundreds of assassinated Palestinian activists and leaders. And as long as Abbas agrees with Washington’s view on the disarming and dismantling of resistance and militant groups as a top priority, he will remain a welcomed friend on the Texas ranch. Otherwise, Arafat’s bombed out basement office in Ramallah will have to suffice.
Abbas also understands that regional alliances are of no great value. Neighboring Arab countries are either completely helpless or eagerly awaiting to normalize with Israel with or without a just end to the conflict. The Arab failure is of course symptomatic and consistent. However, like in the case of Tunisia ready to roll out the red carpet for Sharon soon, the failure is turning into unabashed shamelessness.
The coming months will only exasperate Abbas’ problems. Israel has given him no victory, however symbolic to claim, and is not expected to do so. Poverty in Gaza and elsewhere in the West Bank will grow due to increasing unemployment, as any progress in the Palestinian economy remains an exclusively Israeli decision. The popularity of the Islamic movements, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad will continue to rise and translate into election successes, parallel to the incessant demands from Israel and the United States to crush those same parties.
It is only a matter of time before Mahmoud Abbas decided to end his balancing act and confront his problems head on. But will he choose to lock horns with fellow Palestinians to prolong his illusionary hold on power, or will he decide to face up to Israel’s disregard for rightful Palestinian demands and the blind US support of Sharon’s anti-peace policies?
