ROME, 20 July 2005 — For eavesdropping Italian investigators, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr was more than a dangerous terrorism suspect. Monitored through wiretaps and ambient listening devices, he was a walking, talking link to a larger threat in Europe and beyond — who suddenly vanished on Feb. 17, 2003. That’s when prosecutors say CIA agents kidnapped Nasr and flew him to Egypt.
The cleric, also known as Abu Omar, says he was tortured in Egypt under questioning and refused to be an informant. “The kidnapping of Abu Omar was not just illegal, having seriously violated Italian sovereignty, but it was also harmful and corrosive to the effectiveness of the overall fight against terrorism,” said Milan Judge Guido Salvini, who has a standing arrest order for Nasr.
It is unclear what Egyptian authorities may have learned from the suspect. His lawyer in Egypt told Reuters that he has requested Nasr’s release from custody. Following this month’s rush-hour transport bombings in London, militant groups are warning Italy may be next — and the threats are being taken seriously in Rome.
Prosecutors say evidence from the Nasr investigation, and others like it, prove ongoing militant activity in Italy. That includes fund-raising and recruiting suicide bombers to send abroad, as well as possible attacks inside the country. Wiretap records suggest Nasr supported bombings like the one in London and knew plenty about militant groups in Europe, prosecutors say. Investigators can’t help but wonder what they might have learned had Nasr been fully investigated in Italy.
Intelligence officials believe that Nasr, 42, fought in Afghanistan before arriving in Italy in 1997 and obtaining political refugee status. Investigators accuse him of ties to Al-Qaeda and recruiting combatants for Iraq. Conversation intercepts, viewed by Reuters, show Nasr as more than a Muslim cleric in Milan. Prosecutors say he had contact with militants from Germany, Egypt and elsewhere. They point to computer files filled with jihad recruiting propaganda. “The hope is that we all die martyrs,” he told a Tunisian suspect, in an April 7, 2002, conversation inside a Milan mosque.
Another conversation on April 24, 2002, with an unidentified Egyptian man, also discussed militant attacks. Prosecutors believe that although the other man did most of the talking, it showed Nasr’s awareness of such activity. “So, are these attacks going to be carried out or not?” the man asks Nasr, who initially responds: “What?”
“Let me be clear, I want us to strike inside, outside ... in every country in the world,” he said. Nasr responded, with a laugh, “Use your head!” The conversation continues somewhat cryptically, and Nasr responds - in a muddled context: “They’ll do it. They’ll do it.
Asked by whom, Nasr responds: “The brother in London.” The United States has declined to make any public comment about the Nasr case, even after a Milan judge ordered the June arrest of 13 Americans whom prosecutors say are tied to the CIA.
Rome denies authorizing the kidnap and Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi on July 1 summoned the US ambassador to Rome, Mel Sembler, to demand that Italy’s sovereignty be respected. Opposition politicians have cast doubt on the official line, questioning whether the CIA would have launched such a bold operation without at least informing their Italian counterparts.
The United States and Italy are close allies in foreign policy, and Berlusconi, who sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, has stressed the joint fight against terrorism remains strong. But Italian officials complain that when it comes to intelligence sharing, Washington does not always return the favor. The Nasr case is one example. Prosecutors say that US officials passed bad information to Italian police after the kidnap, saying Nasr had probably gone to fight overseas.
The issue of trust becomes increasingly important in the wake of the London bombings, with European nations seeking greater access to foreign intelligence information.
“The real problem is with the United States, there is a certain difficulty receiving information,” former Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato told local media. “The Americans take an exclusive attitude, without respecting the criteria of the maximum collaboration with Western countries.” The United States is facing questions from other European countries, including Germany, over its transfers of militant suspects abroad. Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif said in May the United States had sent it as many as 70 suspects.
From court documents, it looks like Italian prosecutors were easily able to identify the CIA agents allegedly involved in the daylight abduction of Nasr. Agents filled out registration forms at hotels, many presented frequent-client cards, like “Hilton Honors” and prosecutors even have one agent’s United Airlines frequent flyer number, the documents show.
The big question in Italy is why Washington thought it was necessary to kidnap Nasr. Was Italy too slow to arrest him or too hesitant to react to the intercepts? What information did the CIA have? Nasr, according to one account, was so important he was offered a deal by Egypt’s interior minister - be an informant and return to Italy. Nasr refused and said he was tortured with electric shock, and exposure to extreme noise and temperatures.
“I was very near death,” Nasr told his wife in a 2004 call, intercepted by police, after being released briefly for medical reasons in Egypt. He was rearrested for recounting the ordeal. Italian officials concede they may never know the whole truth, even though Judge Salvini started a judicial process aimed eventually at extraditing, or at least questioning, Nasr. “The fact that he was kidnapped obviously damaged our investigation. That can’t be denied,” said one Italian legal source. “Who knows what we would have learned.”
