The decision by the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance to nominate incumbent Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari as their candidate for the premiership in Iraq’s first permanent government since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein raises more questions about the country’s political stability than it answers. Jaafari has pledged to work with all parties to form a middle-of-the-road government that will represent the interests of all Iraqis, but there are good reasons to believe that one led by him will not last the full four-year course. Indeed it cannot even be certain that the Iraqi Parliament will actually approve his appointment. There are too many undercurrents against him.
His biggest stumbling block is the ultimatum laid down by acting President Jalal Talabani that if he does not include in his government the Iraqi List group led by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, then his own Kurdish Coalition will not vote for him. Jaafari and his supporters in the UIA would find such an inclusion difficult to stomach, and last year he refused point-blank to do so. Although Shiite, the Iraqi List is pro-American and secular. But Jaafari needs Talabani’s support; the UIA does not have a majority in Parliament. He could, of course, try to persuade the Sunnis to back him; but quite apart from the fact that would push the Kurds into opposition and destroy all semblance of national unity, the Sunnis are even less minded to make things easy for him. They hold him responsible for the killing and torture of Sunni insurgents by the Shiite-controlled security services.
Jaafari’s other big problem is that the UIA is itself deeply split. Until Sunday, all the indications were that this broad coalition of Shiite movements would nominate the current Vice President Adel Abdel-Mahdi for the premiership. Jaafari’s nomination was entirely due to Moqtada Sadr swinging behind him. A lot of Iraqis are going to find that a worrying relationship — suspecting, not unreasonably, that Sadr will be looking for a payback.
Talabani’s ultimatum looks like a pre-emptive strike to cripple Jaafari’s position, exploit the divisions within the UIA, and build a new “moderate” grouping of Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites, drawing in Adel and his supporters in the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. The only problem is that while Adel is seen as relatively moderate, Iraq’s Sunnis have no more confidence in SCIRI than in Jaafari. Nor is Talabani in an unassailable position. The post of president will be the first to be elected by the new Parliament. Jaafari could block Talabani’s nomination.
Further complicating and delaying matters is the question of who gets the Interior Ministry. The UIA is determined to keep it; the Sunnis, who see it as the fount of their oppression, want one of their own to be in charge. The suggestion that it be given to Allawi is the sensible compromise. Iraq needs a government of national unity that can end the violence and economic chaos. Jaafari appears to be a figure of national disunity, and there are growing allegations of massive government corruption. The picture is anything but encouraging.
