TUESDAY’S decision by the United States and United Kingdom to withdraw their monitors from the Jericho prison has all the markings of a conspiracy theory hatched in hopes of bolstering the Israeli Kadima party’s electoral fortunes while provoking the nascent Hamas government.
If they did not know about it in advance, surely the US and UK anticipated the likely heavy-handed Israeli reaction. Perhaps it was hoped that Israel’s assault would goad Hamas into abandoning its self-imposed cease-fire.
A Hamas-orchestrated retaliatory attack would almost certainly result in the Palestinian Authority’s isolation from the international community. It is hard to find any other logical explanation for the decision. If it looks like a duck and sounds like a duck, it is probably a duck.
British and American officials strongly dismiss suggestions their unexpected move was the result of collusion with Israel. They also vehemently deny their decision was politically motivated. Instead, they insist the Palestinian Authority is to blame for not fulfilling its commitments to a 2002 agreement; they assert they did not anticipate, nor endorse, the Israeli response.
But their claims ring hollow, especially given the deep and growing credibility gap which plagues the US and Britain across the Arab world.
In the region, the best thing, in fact, that one assumes is that the two allies are recklessly naïve. Or, more likely, this situation appears painfully obvious — an ill-conceived plot to discredit the Hamas-led PA while bolstering Kadima, the so-called Israeli peace party which promises more unilateral actions should they win the upcoming election.
Unfortunately, the allies seem to have fooled few, but angered many in the Arab world once again. Certainly, it is not 1956, but the proffered plot is not much more believable.
The tragedy of Sept. 11 provided the US an opportunity to unite the world — including Arab and Islamic nations — against the scourge of terrorism. Simultaneously, optimists hoped the goodwill accrued could be used to resolve some of the world’s most difficult conflicts — most prominently the Israeli-Palestinian dispute which has retarded the entire Middle East’s political, economic, and social development.
But instead of leading by consensus, the US — with Tony Blair’s Britain acting as reliable accomplice — instead employed pressure and the gun in the volatile Arab world.
On the domestic front, the Bush administration, followed by Congress, capitalized on the public’s fear of terrorism — fears which unfortunately gave rise to xenophobia and Islamophobia.
Collectively, foreign policy and domestic sentiment led to a long list of actions, initiatives, and declarations that have alienated longstanding Arab allies and further damaged America’s abysmal standing in the eyes of the Arab public.
In the past, many Arab criticisms of US policy were dismissed as wild conspiracy theories that emerged in a region ripe with intrigue.
But it is hard to ignore a growing list of issues and grievances which even the most ardent defenders of the Bush administration cannot rationally explain.
After badgering Egypt to implement democratic reforms, the US cringed at the 2005 Egyptian electoral process.
While far from perfect, Egypt did hold its first contested presidential election. The parliamentary elections resulted in substantial gains for the Muslim Brotherhood and independents. But it was not enough.
The violence which marred the third round of the parliamentary elections, and the jailing of presidential challenger Ayman Nour - who has been lionized in the American press - led to a drumbeat of American criticism.
The Bush administrations set aside plans for a US-Egypt free trade agreement, and Congress is threatening to cut Egypt’s foreign aid program.
Meanwhile, the Palestinian elections were conducted openly and fairly. However, after zealously pressing Mahmoud Abbas to hold democratic elections, the US did not like the results.
Since the Hamas victory, the US has worked — at least publicly — to freeze all assistance to the Palestinian Authority.
With the encouragement of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Congress is poised to impose even more punitive measures on the Palestinians.
The UAE is seen by many in the West as a model of Arab modernity — both economically and culturally.
The Emirates have also proved to be a reliable and important ally, particularly in the war on terrorism. But the recent Dubai ports controversy illustrates that strong bilateral ties alone does not make one immune from Sept. 11-related suspicions.
The debate was officially fought over security, but evidence suggests a more sinister, perhaps racist, motivation.
As the contract to operate American ports was already held by a British firm, the issue was not, as some insisted, merely a question of foreign ownership.
These are just a few of the litany of issues for which the US finds itself on the wrong side of Arab public opinion and its regional allies. All of these issues, and others, painfully highlight — intentionally or unintentionally — American duplicity, hubris, and insensitivity.
For the time being, policy makers in the Bush administration and Congress have apparently opted to collectively ignore the fact that there is a price to be paid over time — economically, politically, and culturally — for these decisions. They can choose to ignore the obvious. But that does not change the fact that Tuesday’s maneuver, like the others, may not be a duck, but it sure looks and sounds like one.
