The proposed Indo-US nuclear cooperation deal appears to be the only trouble-free spot for the Bush administration.
Following months of vigorous debate, the first step required to implement the July 2005 deal has been concluded. Last week the House International Relations Committee and the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee passed proposed bills on the deal.
The two bills now require a majority vote in the Senate and the House of Representatives. The new legislation is meant to reverse existing US law that prohibits the US government and companies from entering into any form of nuclear commerce with non-NPT states. It would authorize the president to waive key sections of the existing Atomic Energy Act so that the nuclear deal can be implemented.
The voting by the Congress, i.e. the House and the Senate, will take place well before the November congressional elections.
A foreign policy initiative that had numerous influential critics now has bipartisan support. It was carried in the House committee by a 37 to 5 and in the Senate Committee by a 16 to 2 vote. Significantly it was the convergence of interests of the many India-linked stakeholders and players within the US power structure that provided the rationale for the bipartisan support. The process of committee hearings along with the press and think-tank debates enabled the legislators, representing business, nonproliferation, security and Diaspora interests, to find common ground. The Senate committee held 4 public hearings and called 17 witnesses before coming up with its draft legislation. Apart from this the committees met several times in closed-door sessions with key Bush administration officials and experts.
As the conclusion of the first step already indicates, US Legislators have gone to great lengths to factor in nonproliferation concerns in the proposed bills, making them discernibly different from the original text of the joint statements issued by the two countries in July 2005, and from the draft bill that was introduced in the US Congress at the beginning of this debate in March this year.
As the Congress moves toward the final step of debating and adopting a new law, specific nonproliferation issues will be discussed threadbare. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s chairman, Richard Lugar and its senior most Democrat member, Joseph Biden have both been strong supporters of nonproliferation. Their version of a new law recommends specific checks and controls to discourage India from scaling up its nuclear arsenal.
In his opening comments at the Senate hearing, Lugar clearly stated that America “must ensure this agreement does not undercut our responsibilities under the NPT.” He hoped that the agreement should be “a lasting incentive for India to abstain from further nuclear weapons tests and to cooperate closely with the US in stopping proliferation.”
There have been three major questions that the debate has focused on. One, how far will the benefits accrued to India be used by New Delhi to service its nuclear weapons program directly or indirectly? Two, can this deal be used to promote arms control in the region through measures like concluding the FMCT? Three, what steps can be taken to ensure that the deal does not undermine existing nonproliferation controls?
The dominant concern among the opponents of proliferation is that the deal will enhance India’s capability to produce nuclear weapons. Much of the proposed checks have flowed from the loopholes, identified by nonproliferation experts, in the March 2 separation plan agreed upon by India and the US. The most comprehensive documentation of these concerns is in the Congressional Research Services Report of March 3.
According to this report, the separation plan does not address the future of fast breeder reactors. This contrasts with the restrictive steps that the US is proposing for the enrichment and reprocessing technologies of nuclear and aspiring non-NPT nuclear states. Iran is a case in point.
The plan does not cover India’s nuclear research facilities either. Typically IAEA safeguards for non-nuclear weapon states include all facilities where nuclear material is present, including research and development facilities. Other omissions include the India’s reprocessing and enrichment facilities. Give these facts, the Senate’s version of the bill before the House committee does impose conditions on the US administration to keep the Congress involved in the process of implementing the deal. It seeks constant review of all nuclear exports to India and assurances that the US would not violate its own commitments to the NPT.
The Congress is proposing mechanisms it believes can ensure that the deal will not undermine nonproliferation efforts. Three are noteworthy. One, the bills in both the House and the Senate retain the key section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act that allows for the termination of nuclear cooperation if India conducts nuclear tests or if agreements with the IAEA and the US are broken. Two, India would work with the US to conclude the FMCT. Three, IAEA safeguards on India’s civilian reactors must be in place before the 123 Agreement, detailing the technical aspects of the Indo-US nuclear cooperation is signed.
Clearly these moves do not present a foolproof arrangement to prevent the growth of India’s nuclear arsenal, the undermining of the nuclear deterrence in South Asia or a nuclear arms race in Asia. For example, a key concern regarding freeing up of India’s own uranium for weapons purposes has not been addressed.
In fact Sen. Feingold’s amendment proposing that the US administration certify that India would not divert its fuel for the weapons program did not carry. Bush administration officials indicated that such a condition could be a deal breaker.
The conditions imposed on the administration by the Congress in implementing the nuclear deal does not dilute the impact of this historic shift in US strategic policy in Asia. It will significantly strengthen Indo-US commercial, military and political ties. In Washington the “big picture” effects of this deal are being compared with the US-China opening under President Richard Nixon.
This deal will also cause Asia-wide realignments. While the intricate commercial ties among all the major Asian players preclude any dramatic pulls and pushes, major Asian countries, Russia, Iran, China and Pakistan will seek to reposition themselves.
Perhaps the developments at the May summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization were a signpost to future strategic realignments.
