Musharraf’s Bold Initiative on Kashmir

Author: 
Nasim Zehra, [email protected]
Publication Date: 
Mon, 2006-12-18 03:00

There is a tempest brewing in a teapot over President Pervez Musharraf’s recent remarks allegedly indicating an abrupt change in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. In his Dec. 5 interview to Indian television NDTV, President Musharraf merely reiterated his position how he believed progress over Kashmir was possible. A similar position was also held by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif but media hype and exploitation of the issue by vested interests and politicians combined to promote an uninformed and frenzied discourse on Kashmir. This also mirrors how the Indian opposition party BJP, which actually initiated the peace process and the idea of “give and take” on Kashmir, is publicly resisting any initiative the Congress takes on Kashmir.

In his Dec. 5 interview, President Musharraf again conveyed Pakistan’s willingness to take bold steps to resolve the half-century old issue. Advocating the need for flexibility in traditional positions on Kashmir, Musharraf was clear that if Delhi showed flexibility, so would Pakistan. To illustrate the point he said that were Delhi to move forward on conceding political rights concerning Kashmir, Islamabad too would give up its claim to Kashmir.

Musharraf has proactively sought to break the logjam on the lingering conflict. He has practically pushed forward the Lahore process which zeroed in on seeking a fast-paced solution to the Kashmir issue. He began with the 2001 Agra summit, where he first introduced the notion of a four-step formula, which included knocking out solutions unacceptable to Pakistan and India and to opt for only solutions acceptable to Pakistanis, Indians and Kashmiris.

Subsequently, in his Nov. 18, 2003 interview with Reuters, Musharraf first publicly conveyed the government’s readiness to go beyond “stated positions.” He was clear that a resolution would require that “both sides talk to each other with flexibility...coming beyond stated positions...coming and meeting half way somewhere.”

Finally, in the April 2005 Delhi summit, Musharraf first introduced the four-point-formula seeking a phased withdrawal of troops; local self-governance; free movement of Kashmiris across the LOC and a joint supervision mechanism in Jammu and Kashmir involving India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris. Obviously, Musharraf was not announcing changes in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy but outlined the extent of flexibility Islamabad was willing to bring in its position.

None of this is completely new. Musharraf is attempting to encourage the Indians to move forward. His moves do convey some salient features of a dynamic Kashmir policy. For example, following are five key features of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. One: Islamabad has demonstrated that while it views the UN resolutions providing the legal framework for the Kashmiri case for the right to self-determination, Pakistan will go beyond the UN resolutions that offer the state-integration option requiring the Kashmiris to integrate into Pakistan or India.

Two: the first clear articulation in recent years of Pakistan’s actual position taken at the UN that Pakistan supports the Kashmiris’ right to self-determination, that is, the right of the Kashmiris to determine their own political future. Pakistan has sought Kashmiri integration with Pakistan.

Three: Islamabad is now proactively facilitating an intra-Kashmiri and Kashmiri-Islamabad dialogue by encouraging unrestricted cross-LOC Kashmiri movement. In a significant departure from its previous policy of “favorites” irrespective of their political orientation, Islamabad is now engaging with all Kashmiri groups. This has included the Kashmiri political parties of Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) such as the Muslim Conference and the People’s Democratic Party that have participated in the state elections and have allied with the mainstream Indian political parties.

Four: While Pakistan and India will determine the broad parameters within which a possible solution can be found, only the collective Kashmiri voice should determine the specifics of such a solution.

Five: A process approach which addresses the immediate concerns of the Kashmiris, while with markers on to resolving Kashmir viable approach, must include simultaneous moves - a step by step approach toward solving the issue is feasible.

Pakistan is proposing a staggered solution. As Musharraf moves forward with many ideas tabled on Kashmir, political criticisms abound. The combined opposition has moved an adjournment motion seeking discussion on Musharraf’s statement. The motion questions Musharraf’s right to offer a settlement formula which has not been discussed in any forum. The motion stated: “President Musharraf has stated, replying to a question at a private Indian channel NDTV, that he is ready to give up the United Nation resolutions regarding Kashmir which, in his opinion, can be a settlement with India. He (the president) has given a four-point agenda which has not been discussed on any forum even in Parliament, which is the highest elected institution, and it is a major diversion from the longstanding principled stance of Pakistan on Kashmir.”

The motion stated: “It seems that the president has finally let the cat out of the bag and laid bare the intentions behind the stream of vague and confusing ideas expressed by the Pakistani leadership since the peace process began. The intentions of the president have caused grave concern among the general public and need discussion on the Floor of the House, adjourning the business of the Senate.”

At its Dec. 8 meeting, the PML-N criticized Musharraf for taking a U-turn on the Kashmir issue by withdrawing Pakistan’s just claim on the disputed territory. The party has called on “patriotic forces” to reject Musharraf’s Kashmir proposal. Ironically though, Musharraf’s moves are a logical progression from Sharif’s own government.

Musharraf is not compromising either the Kashmiri position nor is he unilaterally altering Pakistan’s position on Kashmir. He is merely using the tool-kit available to Pakistan — diplomacy, back channel and CBMs — and a maverick positioning to “encourage” change in the Indian position.

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