The war in Iraq is a historic strategic and moral calamity undertaken under false assumptions. It is undermining America’s global legitimacy. Its collateral civilian casualties, as well as some abuses, are tarnishing America’s moral credentials. Driven by Manichean impulses and imperial hubris, it is intensifying regional instability.
Yet major strategic decisions in the Bush administration continue to be made within a very narrow circle of individuals — perhaps not more than the fingers on one hand. With the exception of the new defense secretary, Robert M. Gates, these are the same individuals who have been involved from the start of this misadventure, who made the original decision to go to war in Iraq and who used the original false justifications for going to war. It is human nature to be reluctant to undertake actions that would imply a significant reversal of policy.
From the standpoint of US national interest, this is particularly ominous. If the United States continues to be bogged down in protracted, bloody involvement in Iraq, the final destination on this downhill track is likely to be a head-on conflict with Iran and much of the Islamic world.
We need a strategy to end the occupation of Iraq and to shape a regional security dialogue. Both goals will take time and require genuinely serious US commitment. The quest to achieve these goals should involve four steps.
First, the United States should reaffirm explicitly and unambiguously its determination to leave Iraq in a reasonably short period of time. Right now, the US occupation, even though resented by most Iraqis, is serving as an umbrella for internal intransigence.
Nobody inside or outside the Iraqi government feels any real incentive to compromise while the US is keeping the situation more or less afloat.
A public declaration that the US intends to leave is needed to allay fears in the Middle East of a new and enduring American imperial hegemony.
Second, the United States should announce that it is undertaking talks with Iraqi leaders to jointly set a date by which US military disengagement should be completed. Roughly a year might be a good goal — but the date must be agreed on with the Iraqis and announced as a joint decision.
Only by holding serious talks with Iraqi politicians about an exit date can we identify the authentic Iraqi leaders with the self-confidence and capacity to stand without US military protection.
Third, the United States should encourage Iraqi leaders to issue an invitation to all neighbors of Iraq and perhaps some other Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Pakistan, to discuss how best to enhance stability in Iraq in conjunction with US military disengagement and to participate eventually in a conference regarding regional stability.
Such a serious discussion about regional security cannot be undertaken with Iraq or its neighbors while the US is perceived as an occupier for an indefinite duration. Iraq’s neighbors don’t fear any real explosion in Iraq because we’re there, and the volatile status quo comes at our expense and does not require them to make any real choices.
But an agreed-on departure date would have the effect of forcing all of the governments around Iraq to ask themselves: “How do we deal with the problem of stability in Iraq?
Do we really want to have a regional war among ourselves?” Would a war that might, for example, pit the Saudis and the Jordanians against the Iranians, with the Syrians in between, be worth risking? Most of the regimes in the region know that that kind of a war could spread and destroy them.
That is why the effort to engage the neighbors is desirable; it could help prevent an escalating civil war in Iraq that also poses a mounting threat to their own stability.
But it can only take place provided the United States is in the process of leaving. An announcement of our willingness to leave and to convene a conference to discuss the next steps would be a powerful trigger for change.
Fourth, the US should activate a credible and energetic effort to finally reach an Israeli-Palestinian peace. The record shows that the Israelis and the Palestinians will never do so on their own. Without such a settlement, nationalist and fundamentalist passions in the region in the longer run will doom any Arab regime that is perceived as supportive of US regional hegemony.
— Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Carter.
