Officials, even those at the very top, have resigned because of failures far less spectacular than those of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. The scathing report on his handling of last summer’s Lebanon war, the calls for his resignation — including from his foreign minister — a huge protest rally in Tel Aviv, corruption charges and rock-bottom poll rankings: Any other leader would call it a day with only one of those problems. Yet Olmert continues to govern and believes he can, and should, ride out the storm.
The prime minister says he means to stay in business in order to “correct” the mistakes and rectify the flaws made public by the Winograd Commission which effectively indicted the Israeli government for its severe failure in managing the war in Lebanon. The corrections Olmert has in mind could well include an all-out military adventure in the occupied territories, most probably against the Gaza Strip.
This would restore confidence in the army and help the prime minister regain some popularity. Olmert might be thinking that a particularly heavy-handed approach toward the Palestinians, especially with a readily provided alibi, namely the firing of the ineffective home-made Qassam missiles across the border with Gaza, would help rehabilitate his image and public standing in Israel — and possibly neutralize voices calling for his resignation. Moreover, such a bloody incursion could enhance Kadima’s prospects in case general elections take place this summer, as some Israeli pundits already say is the case.
Should there be such an attack, the outlook for peace is less than encouraging. In its current form, the Israeli government is incapable of putting together a peace deal; a Gaza siege would scrap any hope of an accord. Bereft of political credentials, the government is not in a position to rally the public support needed for a diplomatic breakthrough. The Israeli public is not willing to support a peace package that might include concessions for fear that the Lebanon War will have emboldened Palestinians at the negotiating table as it did Hezbollah on the battlefield. So the peace initiative the Arabs have been working on so hard must remain, like the peace process itself, in a state of suspended animation. It is unlikely to receive any favorable response, at least for the time being.
Olmert’s political upheavals do not appear to be over; the biggest threats to his rule still lie ahead. He might be encouraged by the fact that despite calls for his departure, the rhetoric has not been sustained because of the lack of an obvious successor. But Olmert should not be overly optimistic. His days appear to be numbered as the Winograd report has in effect hobbled an already lame government. Significantly for the Palestinians, and in an ironic twist, while the commission was severely critical of a war that Olmert should not have launched, it increased the possibility of further military adventures.
