Gen. Pervez Musharraf has been at the helm of affairs in Pakistan for almost eight years. Elected politicians held power in the past for much shorter periods of time and that too in a limited measure. They were usually ousted well before the expiry of the term mandated by elections. It is, therefore, not surprising that Pakistan’s polity today bears a strong stamp of Musharraf’s thinking and personality.
Like any absolute ruler, he is destined to remain a controversial figure. But he has shown an uncanny ability to create a formidable power structure that the dispossessed political class found difficult to challenge. In fact, the opposition became increasingly fragmented, marginalized and directionless as the years rolled by. The government he heads is an oligarchy controlled from the center by the top echelon of the military. This control has been effective enough to dispense with the need for direct military rule and provide a brand of soft authoritarianism.
By aligning Pakistan with the United States’ war on terror, Musharraf overcame the problem of international legitimacy. Internally, this alignment lacked consensus but the dispute over it was offset by substantial economic gains. Occasionally, his Western supporters chafed at his inability to secularize the Pakistani society as fast as they wanted. There were unfair spats that he was not doing enough for the success of Western forces in Afghanistan. But he was always able to present himself as the only viable option the West has in the region. Musharraf did not think that he needed a democratic compromise with the internal opposition.
Musharraf had thus no fears in seeking another presidential term while retaining an otherwise tenured post of the chief of army staff. Pakistan must hold elections to the two houses of the federal Parliament and all the provincial assemblies in 2007. Normally, their members constitute the Electoral College to choose the president. Musharraf is averse to political risk-taking and, therefore, hopes to get elected by the existing assemblies before dissolving them for the mandatory general election.
Pakistan’s constitution contains harsh clauses about military intervention and, therefore, indemnification against future treason trials has always been the prime need of military officers who seize power. Musharraf’s takeover was followed by the resignation of several eminent judges. Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, the center of the present turmoil, was not one of them. The Supreme Court validated the military coup, if conditionally. The game plan to seek election from the dying Electoral College has, however, brought judicial assent again to center stage as it would inevitably be challenged in the superior courts.
As the chief justice of Pakistan (CJP), Chaudhry showed notable judicial activism. His landmark decision setting aside the privatization of Pakistan Steel Mill and his relentless pursuit of the cases of missing persons caused displeasure in Pakistan’s power caucus. There is no way of knowing if he would have declared Musharraf’s re-election plan as unconstitutional. In some fateful moment, he was considered an unacceptable risk and a decision to remove him was taken. The national reaction to it was grossly underestimated.
Chaudhry’s refusal to fade away quietly has become a cause celebre. Beginning as lawyers’ demand for his reinstatement, the reaction has turned into a political agitation by diverse groups. In Pakistan’s history, such movements have undergone a dramatic metamorphosis. From a humble beginning they later spread like a prairie fire.
Pakistan is not on the verge of a revolution but is, at the same time, fast approaching a tipping point for a significant change one way or the other. On May 5, CJP Iftikhar Chaudhry took the road from Islamabad to Lahore to address the Bar Council. This particular journey of 300km, punctuated by several large wayside gatherings of lawyers, political activists and ordinary people, took 25 tumultuous hours; Chaudhry was forcibly cast into the role of an icon of resistance by the milling crowds. The same pattern will be repeated in other provinces soon.
Pakistan’s seemingly inviolable power structure is under unprecedented strain. Musharraf had successfully depoliticized the broad masses but their inertia is giving way to a nationwide revival of political activity. His current partners in power — the Pakistan Muslim League that defected from its erstwhile leader, Nawaz Sharif and the Muttaheda Qaumi Movement (MQM) that largely represents the politics of Muslim immigrants from India — are planning to demonstrate in support of Musharraf. Pakistan may face a summer of discontent and confrontation.
Musharraf’s main policies — economic reconstruction in a center-right political framework, secularization of society, cultural Westernization and continued collaboration with the United States — will be threatened if peace is disturbed. Before long he has to take a fundamental decision. He would either take steps to defuse the crisis by making his regime more democratic or snuff out existing freedoms to revert to a more authoritarian rule. Musharraf can broaden his power base by bringing in at least one mainstream political party into it. Apparently, secret contacts with Benazir Bhutto are continuing with tacit Western support though the outcome is shrouded in a thick fog of claims and counterclaims. Bhutto’s own statements in the past made Musharraf’s retirement from the army a precondition for her support. In the charged atmosphere of today, she will not find it easy to compromise on this condition. Most of her associates think of this compromise as political suicide.
Law and politics tend to become indistinguishable at the cutting edge of constitutional debates. Chaudhry’s legal team has been able to orchestrate both the strains simultaneously. Musharraf will now be less sure than before of winning the legal battle. Then the present agitation may strengthen Musharraf’s belief that he must retain direct command of the army. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz has dropped the first hint of national emergency. In a multiethnic and multilingual federation beset with problems of great disparity in economic development, overcentralization of power in the army and suspension of fundamental rights would, however, be problematic.
Pakistan needs a new compact between army and the political class, a serious redefinition of civil-military relations. The present movement has not as yet attained a critical mass to force Musharraf to write this compact. But national interest demands that he should lead this transition rather than preside over political regression.
— Tanvir Ahmad Khan is a former foreign secretary of Pakistan.
