The utter confusion did not last long. For a few days, the key players in the Middle East conflict could see that the Palestinian national movement had split in two, with Hamas seizing Gaza, leaving Fatah in charge of the West Bank, thereby stumbling into a “two-statelet solution” no one ever planned. But what this meant for the historic conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, no one was sure.
Now they’ve had time to regroup, the United States, Europe and Israel think they’ve worked out a response. Not only that, they reckon they have seen a flicker of light in the gloom. The Western strategy is to set up an elaborate demonstration exercise for the Palestinians. They will be offered two alternative Palestines and asked to choose which one best represents their future.
On the West Bank shall arise Fatahland, soon to be showered with cash from the very Western tap that stayed shut as long as Hamas were in the picture. President Mahmoud Abbas will not only receive money but multiple goodwill gestures from Israel: An easing of roadblocks, cooperation on security, a glimpse of the “political horizon”, meaning the prospect of negotiations aimed at an eventual Palestinian state.
In Gaza, meanwhile, would fester the new land of Hamastan, an Islamist-ruled hellhole shunned by the rest of the world, starved of all but the most emergency humanitarian aid. Where Fatahland would feel the warmth of the West’s open arms and deep pockets, Hamastan would know only its cold shoulder. Pretty soon Palestinians would draw the obvious conclusion. As that Israeli government insider puts it, “They’ll understand that moderate policies bring home the bacon, while the other road brings only pain.”
You can see the appeal. If all went to plan, either Gazans would eventually rise up and eject Hamas from power, or Hamas itself would realize it had to change course. After all, if the Palestinians of the West Bank were marching toward prosperity and statehood, Gazans would not want to be left behind. The upheaval of last week could surely bring another happy benefit.
It sounds logical enough. Nurture a flowering Fatahland while pariah Hamastan withers away. But it is surely a delusion. The first and most obvious danger is that the more generous the West is to Abbas, the more his credibility will be destroyed. Already the Arab press is comparing Abbas with Antoine Lahad, the strongman whose hated South Lebanon Army served as Israel’s policeman. As has happened so often before, in seeking to boost “moderates,” the West only hugs them to death.
Besides, the whole idea rests on a series of faulty assumptions. First, it assumes that Israel will indeed come through with the goodies it promises. Second, even if Israel does hand over the cash, there is no guarantee that Abbas’ Fatah-dominated administration could translate that into improvements on the ground.
But let’s be optimistic and imagine the new approach did indeed bear fruit on the West Bank. Do we imagine that Hamas would calmly sit by, watching itself being pushed out of the Palestinian future? Veteran Palestinian analyst and negotiator Ahmad Khalidi asks, “What incentive is there for Hamas to play along and not spoil it?” We all know how easy it would be to wreck any rapprochement between Fatahland and Israel: A simple terror attack on Israeli civilians and it would all be over. Hamas could be clever about it and ensure the attack came not from Gaza but from the West Bank, say in the Hamas stronghold of Nablus. That would undermine Abbas instantly.
The dangers are multiple. If the West Bank is lavished with money but much of it stays in Fatah’s gilded circle, thereby creating a class of haves and have-nots, there would be a surge of precisely the resentment that led to Hamas’ election victory in January 2006. Who knows, Hamas could even end up taking over the West Bank too — after all, they had the edge over Fatah in elections there.
The sounder approach is surely to recognize that Hamas is now a fact of life in Palestine. Hamas enjoys a democratic mandate; it now rules a territory that threatens to be a Taleban-style state on Israel’s doorstep. It simply makes no sense to pretend that it does not exist.
The choice now, says Tel Aviv University analyst Gary Sussman, is either “to isolate Hamas, pushing it further into the Iranian orbit, or to engage it, luring it into the Western and Sunni orbit”. This has to be the more pragmatic course. The story of the last few decades has been a constant effort to wish the Palestinians were represented by people other than those who actually led them. Each of those attempts has ended in failure.
