The laudable part of the defeat of South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki as president of the African National Congress at the hands of his former deputy Jacob Zuma was the statesmanlike way in which Mbeki and his supporters accepted their loss. Less praiseworthy is the character and political quality of the victor. Mbeki fired Zuma after the latter was accused of corruption and rape. The corruption trial collapsed and Zuma was acquitted of the rape, but prosecutors are reportedly planning to bring fresh charges against the left-of-center politician. Zuma’s political recovery has been little short of remarkable. Markedly more charismatic than Mbeki, Zuma’s strength lies in his support from the trade unions and young ANC activists, both of whom believe that South Africa’s booming economy is at the expense of the poor and unemployed. They are calling for some renationalization. Zuma also has a number of powerful business backers, some of whom have themselves been linked to corruption.
There can be no doubt that fraud and speculation has increased in South Africa and poses a long-term threat to the efficient functioning of the economy. This is because the channels for accountability are often blocked by officials or completely ignored. A more thoughtful man than Zuma might have wondered, even if he knew himself to be innocent of any fraud, whether it was good for his country as a whole to have as president a man who had been accused of corruption. And Jacob Zuma seems set to be South Africa’s president when Parliament comes to elect a successor to Mbeki in two years’ time. The issue now is whether the ANC will once again close ranks around its new leader. There is a sound democratic case for hoping that it will not. South Africa’s problem is that since the ANC assumed leadership of the country in 1994, it has had to deal with only a small and weak parliamentary opposition, which has been unable to hold the government accountable on every single issue. This has not been healthy. It has led to a succession of poor or dubious decisions which have gone largely unchallenged. In addition, it is simply not healthy for the ANC to see itself as the natural party of government. If parliamentarians and the bureaucrats that they appoint believe that they will be able to function unchallenged for their entire careers, they are unlikely to feel they have always to give their best and, if offered bribes, may well be tempted to give their worst.
Were the ANC, therefore, to split in the coming months, into conservative and left-of-center wings, and set out clearly differentiated policies, South Africa’s democracy would probably be stronger. At the moment, voters simply do not really have a choice. The small opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, has neither the funds nor the organization to mount a nationwide electoral campaign. A breakaway ANC very probably would, though Thabo Mbeki might not be the best man to lead it into vigorous parliamentary opposition.
