The Iraqi government is seeking to reimpose its control of Basra, the country’s second city. Although this moment had to come — for any part of the country to be run as a lawless fiefdom is totally unacceptable — there is no denying it is a high-risk move for two key reasons.
This is the first major test for the new security forces, 50,000 of whom have been deployed into Basra. Will they demonstrate the training and ability to overcome the militias that have effectively run this city even before the British withdrew to the outskirts last September? Early evidence is that the gunmen have put up stiff resistance. If the fighting drags on, not only will the security forces face humiliation, but ordinary Basrawis will be in dire straits as they run out of food because markets are closed and the streets are battle zones.
The second concern is that the Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr will denounce the truce which, since it came into effect last August, has done a great deal to reduce the level of violence in much of the country. Yesterday he threatened civil conflict. His men have thrown Iraqi police out of his political power base — the run-down Sadr City district of Baghdad where some two million Shiites live. But it remains to be seen if he really intends once again to take on the government and the occupation forces behind them.
For a start, the Mehdi Army is not the only government target in Basra. The Badr Brigade allied to the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC) and the smallest militia, the Fadhila, are also being assaulted by Iraqi police and army. These groups had been fighting each other and have been implicated in oil and narcotics smuggling. Outright criminal gangs have also been operating alongside or between them. The anarchic result in Iraq’s premier port and oil center is a serious threat to economic recovery. It is also questionable just how much control Sadr now has over neighborhood warlords who claim to act in his name. Despite renewing the cease-fire last month, so-called “rogue” elements throughout the Mehdi Army have stepped up attacks, particularly against Americans.
It may be significant that Sadr’s office has blamed the government’s Basra assault on “politics” ahead of expected provincial elections this autumn. This suggests the militia leader still values the political process. He quit the national unity government in November 2006, protesting Premier Maliki’s meeting with President Bush. The following January, Sadr and his people rejoined only to quit again four months later, demanding a timetable for the coalition’s withdrawal. He may have been influenced then by Iran president. President Ahmadinejad’s important recent visit to Baghdad, however, emphasized the need for political solutions, effectively wrong-footing Sadr’s tactics. The Iranian president may also have accepted, at least in principle, that Basra could no longer remain in divided chaos. The question for the militia leader is whether his power would increase through renewed conflict or if he tried to take his supporters back into the political process.
