It is clear what Robert Mugabe wants to see from the talks with the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) that began in South Africa on Thursday. On Dec. 27, 1987, he sat down with Joshua Nkomo, the leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and signed a unity accord. It followed seven years of sustained violence against Nkomo’s party in which some 18,000 people died. The creation of a government of national unity made Nkomo vice president. Three ZAPU leaders were given Cabinet posts. They might as well have been hamsters in a cage on Mugabe’s desk.
This is what Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the MDC, must remember as he sits down at the talks. Like Nkomo, his party has been battered, with many of his MPs dead, in hiding or facing charges, and more than 1,500 officials in prison. The mediator, Thabo Mbeki, and other African presidents would be happy with a deal similar to the 1987 accord. But will the MDC be able to arm-wrestle a deal that leads to Mugabe stepping down or to free and fair elections — or even a joint Mugabe/Tsvangirai control of the state and its security apparatus? The question, as Humpty Dumpty said, is: Who is to be master?
Much is being made of the Kenyan model forged earlier this year when the country exploded after a stolen election. Raila Odinga, who most neutral observers considered to have won, accepted the post of prime minister under Mwai Kibaki’s presidency. But Kenya is different. The security apparatus remained largely unengaged, if not neutral, in Kenya’s violent January. Kibaki is no Mugabe, and Kenya’s politicians are more cynical. In return for a slice of the power pie, they traded in their loyalty to principles and voters.
In Zimbabwe everyone in the power structure has been appointed by Mugabe, all are loyal members of ZANU-PF. Several of the military and security bosses have pledged their refusal to allow Tsvangirai to come to power.
Their “right to rule” comes not solely from their “conquest” of the country by war against white rule, it is also because many Zimbabweans voted for them. In the March parliamentary elections, ZANU-PF gained more votes than Tsvangirai’s MDC.
Even discounting rigging and bullying, the unpalatable fact is that there is still popular support for Mugabe and those around him.
Is it conceivable that some time in the near future — two weeks to complete the talks is an unlikely deadline — Prime Minister Tsvangirai will say to Emerson Mnangagwa, the man who organized the reign of terror since the March election, that it is time to retire? Could he tell Gen. Philip Sibanda that he is no longer head of the army? Miracles of reconciliation, peace and power sharing have happened before in Africa but this is not credible. Mugabe and his cronies have allowed the country to be destroyed in order to hold on to power. Talks, for Mugabe, are not about reaching a compromise, they are a time-wasting ploy while he prepares for more war, or a tool for retaining — even extending — power.
What strengths does Tsvangirai have? The support of millions of Zimbabweans and a stubbornness that the flaky Nkomo lacked. Support from Western countries is a double-edged sword. They provide financial, technical and diplomatic support but they also give Mugabe a cause — anti-imperialism — to unite his allies. And their power is waning. The Chinese and Russian veto of the American UN Security Council resolution calling for sanctions against Mugabe last week marked the full stop at the end of the West’s exclusive post Cold War domination of Africa. They cannot rescue Zimbabwe.
Much weight was put on the rest of Africa in sorting out Zimbabwe but the African Union ducked its responsibilities at its summit in Egypt last month and passed the buck back to Mbeki. His power as president of South Africa is ebbing daily. The African National Congress, now dominated by allies of Jacob Zuma, is removing Mbeki’s allies from positions of power and is setting up a parallel ANC negotiation. In the next few months we may see South Africa begin to take the Zimbabwe crisis seriously.
But can Zimbabwe’s economy wait? It is sliding quickly into subsistence and starvation with guns and mobiles. There are no buffers, just endless decline. Tsvangirai knows that confidence and financial support will not return without his say-so. But the ruling elite are not troubled. Some make good money out of Zimbabwe’s ruin. They are shifting their money overseas; sending the Zimbabwe dollar on down. They can always bring a little foreign exchange back and buy a few trillion dollars to pay servants and purchase food and black-market fuel. The only question is how long the government can produce money to pay its troops, police and thugs?
For different reasons, both sides may play for time. At present whatever moral and political strength Tsvangirai has, Mugabe is in power. Unless something inside ZANU-PF happens to unseat him, the battle for democratic change in Zimbabwe is far from over.
— Richard Dowden is director of the Royal African Society. His book: Africa Altered States, Ordinary Miracles is published in September.
