THE ongoing disarray among Pakistan’s new civilian leadership, including its refusal to accept a US military training mission for the Pakistani Army, has led to intense frustration within the Pentagon and reignited a debate over whether the US should act on its own against extremists operating in Pakistan’s western tribal regions.
Any Pentagon support for more direct action inside Pakistan would mark a significant shift for military brass, which for months has resisted a push from other parts of the US government, primarily counterterrorism officials within the CIA, who have favored large-scale covert operations to go after the Al-Qaeda leadership.
The internal debates have taken on new urgency in recent weeks, amid US intelligence warnings that Al-Qaeda and other militant groups are flourishing in western Pakistan. At the same time, there is a growing belief within the US government that the new leadership in Islamabad has proved to be ineffectual and preoccupied with internal squabbling in the wake of President Pervez Musharraf’s resignation.
Thursday’s bombing of a munitions plant in Pakistan that killed more than 50 people, for which the Taleban claimed credit, has added fresh fuel to US concerns. Attacks by the Taleban and other militants also have been increasing in Afghanistan, and military commanders have said safe havens within Pakistan are responsible for the rising violence in both countries.
“Radical terrorist groups in the border regions have undermined and fought against the central government of Pakistan and carved out sanctuaries and training bases,” said a senior US officer in Afghanistan.
US military leaders have resisted suggestions for direct intervention in Pakistan out of concern that it would alienate what is supposed to be a friendly government and might lead to an explosion of anti-US sentiment, and possibly violence, among Pakistanis. In a less provocative step, the US has proposed to send US military trainers into the region.
Complicating matters further, US leverage with the Pakistani military is extremely limited. Years of sanctions against Pakistan following nuclear tests in the 1990s has produced a generation of officers who have had little or no interaction with US counterparts and — unlike those of the new head of the Pakistani army, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani and Musharraf’s age — are highly skeptical of US intentions in the region.
At the CIA, there is widespread skepticism toward the Pentagon’s hopes of a retrained Pakistani military handling the problem. Military and intelligence officials describe the differences of opinion as a long-running dispute between some elements within the CIA and many in the Pentagon leadership.
Fueling the urgency within the CIA, several current and former officials said, is the White House’s desire to see Osama Bin Laden eliminated before the end of the administration, leading some within the White House to side with the CIA’s aggressive plans.
