IN 1999 the then Russian President Vladimir Putin tried to succeed where Boris Yeltsin had failed, and once again sent large troop concentrations into Chechnya to quell the independence movement. As the conflict now enters its 10th year, it would seem that Moscow has the insurgency more or less under control. But appearances may be deceptive. There are no independent foreign media permitted to travel freely in Chechnya and the few visits allowed are closely chaperoned. The Russian media meanwhile have learned to keep their noses out of contentious issues. Consequent self-censorship means little real news of the state of affairs in Chechnya reaches Russians elsewhere. The few non-governmental-organizations (NGOs) that are still managing to operate in the Chechnya — particularly in refugee camps — are increasingly being obliged to curtail their operations. There is, therefore, little clear information reaching the outside world. Nevertheless, although many of its leaders have been slain, the rebellion does continue.
The Russians have conducted a classic divide and rule strategy. President Ramzan Kadyrov, who succeeded his slain father Akhmad, runs a small part of the country almost as a personal fief with his own elite military force and his own limited system of taxation. To the Kremlin’s satisfaction, he also pursues any potential local rivals. But in line with Moscow’s determination to keep Chechnya as an integral part of Russia, the real decisions are made by a few top Russian civilian administrators and to a greater extent by the Russian military. Kadyrov is largely marginalized, as evidenced by the Kremlin’s refusal to accept his claims on the local revenues of the Russian oil giant Rosneft.
Kadyrov has, however, recently made common cause with Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, the new Russian-appointed president in neighboring Ingushetia, which before World War II was lumped with Chechnya into a single Soviet state. (Both populations were deported to Central Asia in 1944 for supporting the Nazi German advance into the Caucasus — returning only in the late 1950s). The Russians are facing a second insurgency in Ingushetia and Yevkurov’s replacement of the corrupt and ineffectual Murat Zyazikov must, the Kremlin hopes, give it a better chance to crush the rebels. Kadyrov’s courting of Yevkurov may, therefore, be at the Russian instigation but the Chechen leader may have other ideas. A renewed tie-up between the two small republics could provide a more plausible case for autonomy, not least since Ingushetia with a population of just 300,000 is already “semi-autonomous” while Chechnya, with 1.1 million inhabitants is simply a republic within the Russian Federation.
The Kremlin will surely watch the two presidents closely but their main interest will be to continue the repression of Chechen resistance that has drawn support from Ingushetia. Despite the unexpected effects of the economic downturn, Russia currently still feels strong enough to crush the rebellion and help Kadyrov rebuild the country. However, ever since the original early 19th century resistance to Russia led by Mansur Ushurma and then Imam Shamil, history has shown that when Russia is weak, the Chechen separatists become strongest and in between, never go away.
