Turkey’s affiliations under the leadership of the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan — a devout Muslim — are swinging from West to East. This is good news for the Arab world as Ankara is a major political and military player on the international stage with substantial clout. In recent times, Turkey has thawed the freeze with Syria by signing a slew of economic, cultural, social and strategic cooperation agreements and is mulling over lifting visa restrictions for Syrian and Lebanese nationals.
At the same time, Turkey is reaching out to Armenia by setting up a commission to study the World War I conflict that robbed the lives of over a million Ottoman-Armenians. Last October, Ankara and Yerevan signed protocols designed to establish ties that would result in the reopening of their border but the main sticking point is Armenia’s insistence that Turkey and the international community officially recognize the Armenian genocide. Turkey has always resisted that damning label and always insisted that those who died were casualties of conflict.
Simultaneously, the Erdogan government is cementing relations with Russia with trade and energy agreements; Russia currently supplies around 65 percent of Turkey’s natural gas requirements and may assist Turkey with the construction of a nuclear energy plant. This new closeness has resulted in plans to extend cooperation to the South Caucasus — traditionally within Russia’s sphere of influence — as well as visa-free travel for the citizens of both nations.
Likewise, Ankara currently enjoys good relations with Tehran. Earlier this month, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki held talks in Ankara with Prime Minister Erdogan involving the transportation of Iranian natural gas to Europe via Turkey, establishing a joint refinery, jointly constructing industrial centers and increasing bilateral trade from $10 billion annually to $30 billion. The Turkish minister of state said Turkey is keen to begin a “golden age” in Turkish-Iranian ties. While Turkey is against nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, it backs Iran’s right to nuclear energy and does not support anti-Iranian sanctions.
But there the love fest ends. Ankara’s relations with some of its traditional allies are strained to say the least.
ITS important strategic alliance with Washington, which culminated in America’s Incirlik Air base was shaken when the US invaded Iraq in 2003. Turkey was against the Iraq war from the get-go and blames it for strengthening Kurdish secessionist ambitions. And when, in 2007, the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a resolution in favor of Armenia’s stance on the alleged “genocide,” Turkey temporarily withdrew its ambassador from Washington.
However, for its part, the US government tends to tread softly with Turkey in light of its NATO role as a strong eastern bulwark and its hosting of Incirlik which was a crucial asset during the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War. Turkey’s importance to Washington was reflected by President Barack Obama’s official visit, last April — criticized within some US circles as blessing a country embarked on establishing a powerful Islamic bloc contrary to American interests. The US has also fervently backed Turkey’s efforts to join the EU, which has been somewhat of an annoyance to European countries that are vehemently opposed.
Indeed, hopes of Turkey’s EU membership are fast fading. With some reluctance, the 27-member union began talks on Turkey’s eventual entry in 2005 but despite Turkey’s compliance with entrance requirements, such as a ban on capital punishment, it is still being criticized on its failure to reach an accord on the divided island of Cyprus. The latter accusation is unfounded when it was a Greek-Cypriot ballot that stymied progress.
THE Turkish government believes France and Germany, in particular, are erecting obstacles where none exist. Both of these “old European” countries have been open in their opposition to Turkish accession, preferring a “privileged partnership.” French President Nicolas Sarkozy is fiercely opposed. In 2007, he said this: “I do not think Turkey has a place in Europe”; its place is in “Asia Minor.” And, last year, Sarkozy warned Obama to stay out of Europe’s business when it comes to Turkey’s EU bid. It’s little wonder, therefore, that Ankara is hedging its bets by cultivating other alliances even while it’s officially sticking to the EU program.
But the relationship that is most in jeopardy is with Israel, which goes back to 1948 when Turkey was the first predominantly Muslim country to recognize the Jewish state. Since, the two countries have benefited from military cooperation in terms of arms sales, joint maneuvers, and pilot exchanges. They also enjoy trade relations and have signed a “Turkish-Israeli Free Trade Agreement.” That warmth has now been replaced by a distinct chill for various reasons.
In the first instance, Erdogan has loudly condemned Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza to the extent of walking off a stage at the World Economic Forum in Davos last year after angrily sparring over the issue with Israeli President Shimon Peres. The Turkish PM has referred to Israel’s attack as “disproportionate” and “a crime against humanity.”
Then, last month, Israel’s discourteous treatment of Turkish Ambassador Ahmet Oguz Celikkol — called to answer Israeli criticisms of a Turkish television series that painted Israelis in a negative light — caused a diplomatic incident. This was sparked by Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon who ordered the removal of the Turkish flag during a joint press conference and told Israeli journalists to take note that the Turkish diplomat was seated on a low sofa while the Israeli officials had been given much higher chairs.
Erdogan was quick to warn Israel that its deliberate humiliation of its diplomat threatened bilateral cooperation. “Losing a friend like Turkey in the future should be an issue to which Israel should give some thought…” he said. The tense situation was calmed by an apology from Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The Turkish government is currently walking a tightrope over the Bosphorus between the east and the west but in the event it decides to take a giant leap toward the Orient, Israel and its European allies will have only themselves to blame. Their loss will undoubtedly be this region’s gain.
