The scene after the theory of Ibn Khaldun

Two weeks ago, I wrote that the Arab Spring foretells the shifting social foundation upon which sociologist Abdul Rahman bin Mohammed Ibn Khaldun based his theory on the state. The discriminatory theory was an attempt to present a social justification for what is known as the “prevalent reign,” or balance of power in society.
Ibn Khaldun unveiled the social basis of this power, which allows and calls for the capture of the state. This is the theory of ethnocentrism, which means that society dominated by prevalent political reign has a particular social structure that is established by social consensus.
This structure is characterized by tribalism. The ethnocentrism, as a social factor, is the decisive factor, while physical force, particularly the military, is merely a tool in the founding or seizing of the state. Tribalism, through its ethnocentrism and its values, is the active actor in the structure of society, and plays a role in the political processes in that it creates governance.
There is no place here for more details. But I will discuss what the author of The Muqaddimah has provided on this point specifically. Ibn Khaldun argues that “ethnocentrism is the too of protection, defense, and claiming.” Accordingly, he argues that people by virtue of their humanitarian nature “need a restrainer and governor to restrain them from each other, but this governor must do so through ethnocentrism in order to succeed — the outcome of such is subsequently the rule.”
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the political landscape in the five Arab countries seems different. The political scene is active, based on the ideas, union, and organization of different political, constitutional and religious aspects. However, organization of the modern state differs from that of the traditional tribe in several clear and distinct matters. Firstly, and most importantly, there is a difference in the nature and basis of affiliation. The tribe is a normal social institution based on relationships and descent, or ethnocentrism. It is a closed institution that excludes those who are not related through the paternal bloodline.
On the other hand, the modern regime or politically organized body is a created institution based on affiliation through vision, common interests and goals. Unlike the tribe, it allows for the participation and inclusion of all. The second active difference is that people are becoming de facto members of the political process, an activity they were not involved in before. When you consider this idea of the organization and participation of the masses, the idea of ethnocentrism as a framework for the political process and basis of rule and state establishment is off set.
Some justifiably and accurately argue that the political process is still immature and in its early stages, and are prone to relapse and even regression to pre-revolution ways.
While relapse is very likely and natural, the probability of regression is not. Relapse is probable, and sometimes even inevitable, because popular revolutions initially generate a state of confusion, turmoil and violence, all in conjunction to past and new conflicts. Because the revolutionary phase is a transitional phase between the past and present, many things during this time will occur both in favor of and against the revolution. We should not forget that there is also the so-called “counter revolution,” which is based on action and generative reactions. During this transitional phase, which may be long or short, the revolution is not complete until it has passed through a maturing processing.
Even the Syrian revolution, which now appears to be in a critical stage not experienced in the revolutions of the other countries, cannot be a setback for the country. The revolution, despite the torrential bloodshed, has determined the fate of the regime and its leadership as no longer part of Syria’s future.
The indicators of this are numerous, including the demands and promises by the leadership of the regime itself to engage in dialogue with the opposition and commit to reforms to help the Syrian people achieve their aspirations. This is language the regime never previously adhered to, nor language that anyone outside the regime was willing to say publicly. Moreover, the systemic destruction of Syrian cities, villages and neighborhoods, as well as the bloodshed due to the regime’s brutal acts, has revealed the truth of the regime to the people and demolished its legitimacy. Even forces that once understood, sympathized, and even benefited from the regime, such as the so-called Damascus and Aleppo dealers, have lost their voice and were shocked from the willingness of the regime to go to great lengths against them in order to protect itself.
It is interesting that all well-known intellectuals in Syria from various backgrounds and viewpoints have either joined the opposition or taken refuge in silence and isolation. Everyone is now aware the regime is responsible for the Syrian revolution being the longest, bloodiest, and most painful of the revolutions of the Arab Spring; this in itself denies the possibility of relapse.
One question remains: Can we understand from the events of the Arab Spring — and what is to come of them — that the social basis of the theory of Ibn Khaldun is present and coherent? The occurrence of revolutions itself suggests that the elements of this basis were exposed to decaying processes of various magnitudes across the Arab world. Given that eight centuries separate us from The Muqaddimah, more questions arise: Did such decay require all time of long-standing centuries? Have Arabs suffered from a stalemate since the collapse of the Abbasid Empire during the era of Ibn Khaldun?
To address these legitimate questions, further questions emerge: What about the huge difference between the “state” during that time and the “state” today in terms of strength, breadth of grip on society, and destructive abilities? Due to successive technological revolutions, the state has been able to reach ever inch of its territory and expanding its destructive power more than in the past. Again, refer to the Syrian case. Also, what about the clash with the West and its role in the political stalemate? Finally, what about the dominance of religious discourse and its role in the rigidity of political culture? Religion is the sacred text of political culture, and its implementation and impact is no longer directly and literally related to the text itself, but rather subject to those who read, interpret, construe, and apply their interpretations drawing from certain views and agendas. There now exists the use of religious text to expand political interests and serve the political stalemate, regardless if this is intentional or due to political pressure. Sheikh Mohammed Saeed Al- Bouti offers in Syria these days a typical example of justifying tyranny and political stalemate.
We often forget that the roots of the modern era date back a different interpretation by Martin Luther of the Bible, an interpretation that lead to the development of Calvin and became known in European history as the Reform Movement. This was at the beginning of the 16th century AD/10th century AH.
The event proves that the roots and origins of modernism trace back to the church, and resulted in the separation of church and state. It stripped the church of influential power, specifically its monopoly power over the development of community awareness. The event also proves that the formulation of awareness in society cannot only be achieved by military force of force of law, but also with the power of thought, ethics and human value. Its outcome was that religious text became subject to man and history, rather than vice versa, as was the case during the time of church power.
Regardless of how much time separates us from The Muqaddimah, we cannot avoid the hypothesis that the occurrence of the Arab Revolutions in such great magnitude indicates that the ethnocentrism theory, which Ibn Khaldun considered the most important factor in the genesis of the state, is perhaps already cracked.
This leaves us with a third set of questions: What is ethnocentrism specifically? Is it limited to genealogy, or is it more than that? Take, for instance, Yemeni society, which is far more tribal than the Syrian society. Despite such, Yemen’s revolution did not slip into such devastating ethnocentric war such as that in Syria. Why is this? We should be aware that these questions mean that modern times have exceeded the scope of Ibn Khaldun’s theory.

n Courtesy of Al-Hayat newspaper