Tactical voting strategy has come of age
The Uttar Pradesh Assembly election in March is a historic event for the Muslim community. For the first time since 1950, the Muslims secured almost their due share in proportion to their state population, primarily because they accepted the strategy of tactical voting, voting unitedly and massively for one selected candidate in many constituencies of Muslim concentration and not dividing their votes on the basis of political affinity, sect or grouping.
The Muslim community, according to census 2001, forms 18.5 percent of the state population (and nearly 22.5 percent of the national Muslim population). By principle of proportional representation, they should have at least 72 seats in the UP Assembly in a total strength of 403. For the first time since 1950, in 2012 the figure has reached 69, close to the marks, while from election to election, it varied from 23 in 1991 to 54 in 2007.
Perhaps the demolition of the Babri Masjid had a painful impact on the Muslim community. Its political effect was that it completely lost its faith in the Indian National Congress which then formed the government at the Centre. Indeed, it held Prime Minister Narasimha Rao more responsible for the demolition. Bharatiya Janata Party Chief Minister in UP Kalyan Singh never concealed his objective, while Narasimha Rao repeatedly gave Muslims false assurances about his commitment to protect the mosque.
Now he appears to the have acted clearly in collusion with the BJP and perhaps for reason yet to be revealed he deliberately destroyed the chance of the Congress to come back to power in UP for many years. The Muslim community has not yet overcome its anger and alienation. Even the energetic canvassing by Rahul Gandhi in 2012 could not diminish it. This was a parting of ways since independence, when the Muslim community had taken shelter under the umbrella of the Congress and depended upon it for its defense and protection against the rising menace of Hindutava (Hindu fundamentalism).
In 2012, as in 2007, the main contestants were the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), the Samajwadi Party (SP), the BJP and the Congress. For two terms in 2002 & 2007 the BSP had secured an overall majority due to Muslim support and formed the government leaving the SP with only 160 seats in 2007. This time the SP turned the tables and won 224 seats and pushed the BSP to a very low second position, while the BJP and the Congress retained their third and fourth positions respectively.
The SP has formed the state government on its own, while in the past it had taken the support of the BJP or BSP. There was not much change in the partywise percentage of vote; SP went up by 4.5 % to 30.1 % and the BSP went down by 4.2 % to 25 %; the Congress vote went up by 5.5 %, while the BJP was down by 2 %. Partly because Muslim mobilization was better now the voter turnout was the highest ever, with Muslim women and youth in the forefront. But under the present first-past-the-poll system no actual partywise count of Muslim votes is available, but it is estimated at least 70-75 % of the Muslims voted for the SP by switching away from the BSP. The breakup of Muslim MLAs is: SP 42, BSP 16, Congress 6, Peace Party 2, two other so-called ‘Muslim parties’ 3.
The BJP, which had not fielded any Muslim candidate, had naturally no Muslim MLA. Some commentators have stated that nearly 10 % of Muslim votes went to the BJP. This is an aggregation, but sporadic Muslim vote in isolated constituencies with small Muslim presence, for the sake of security, went to it. Surprisingly, the BJP has also bagged several constituencies with high Muslim concentration, because Muslim votes were divided among several secular parties and the BJP has benefited from the division of Muslim votes.
What is interesting is that, apart from the victory of 69 Muslim MLAs in over 40 seats, Muslim candidates were the runners-up, losing some seats by small margins. This shows that Muslim representation in the Assembly could have crossed 100 with a little more determined effort in all Muslim concentration seats.
This shows that, even without reservation or change of electoral system, Muslims can secure due representation in legislature through what has been called tactical voting, if maximum vote massively and unitedly in Muslim concentration constituencies for selected candidates. The general impression is that the BSP retained its hold on the scheduled caste and secured the support of a section of other backward classes and Muslims. The SP by and large retained its dominance among other non-Muslim OBCs and MBCs and secured as selected above a much larger proportion of Muslim votes as well as some votes of the Rajputs. The BJP attracted high caste as well as Hindutva votes, while the Congress had a small following in all major social groups. The Congress got neither high caste nor Muslim nor scheduled caste votes which had been its base since 1950.
In Muslims concentration districts in western UP, Rohilkhand and eastern UP, Muslims voted solidly for Muslim candidates. On the other hand, in a few high Muslim concentration districts like Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Meerut, Lucknow, Baghpat, Shahjahanpur, Varanasi and Pratapgarh their count was disproportionately low.
On the eve of the election, the Joint Committee of Muslim Organizations for Empowerment (JCMOE) had issued guidelines for tactical voting by Muslim voters suggesting that they vote unitedly and massively for a common candidate. In constituencies below 20 % Muslim concentration, they should vote for the most winnable candidate of a secular party irrespective of religion and party.
In the second category where the Muslims formed between 20% and 30 %, they should vote for the most winnable secular candidate, but preferably Muslim. In the next higher category, Muslim voters should vote exclusively for the most winnable Muslim candidate. It was also suggested that in each constituency of interest, local polling committees, consisting of members of the intelligentsia, the professional class and the ulema, should select the Muslim winnable/supportable candidate and canvass for him through all possible means and advice Muslims that their turnout should be maximized and that they should unitedly vote for the chosen candidate, rising above ‘maslak’, grouping, caste and politics. It can be said that the Muslim voters did not divide their votes and largely supported the chosen candidates, and did not waste their votes.
Muslim voting in UP has set a pattern which is likely to be followed in all Muslim concentration states in future. Muslim candidate of different maslaks and groupings can be selected in a complementary manner from neighboring constituencies in the same district for producing a balance.
Success depends on thorough preparation, identification of districts and constituencies in which Muslims form the dominant group above 30 % in the population and avoid division among sects and political parties. What is essential is that at the constituency level Muslim voters should wholeheartedly support the selected Muslim candidate.
The next test of tactical voting will be the general election of 2014. Their representation in the Lok Sabha should reach at least 70 and it is possible if they identify winnable Muslim seats in every state/district and best available candidates. Political parties will learn not to impose arbitrary selection in view of the consensus in the community. Tactical voting will also eliminate the division of Muslim votes in the newly born ‘Muslim parties.’ Once in the legislature Muslim legislators will be under pressure to raise matters of Muslim interest and project, their feelings and aspirations. Tactical voting strategy, when this writer first proposed it, was mocked and ridiculed. Today, it has come of age.
- The writer is a senior Indian diplomat-turned-politician.
This article is exclusive to Arab News.
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