CAMBRIDGE, Mass., 14 December 2003 — The fight over the Legal Framework Order between a major section of the elected parliamentarians and the Pakistani establishment appears to be drawing to a close.

The establishment is signaling that it understands that it is necessary to deal with the LFO crisis. It will not simply disappear. Even if the establishment’s key Western supporters maintain that the LFO is not “an ordinary man’s issue”, the negative fallout of the unresolved dispute will be continuing political instability — meaning constant protests and virtual paralysis in Parliament and Senate.

The clash over the LFO mirrored the ongoing power struggle among Pakistan’s civil and uniformed power groups. The elected parliamentarians wanted to restrict the constitutional space that the unelected establishment carved out for itself.

Gen. Pervez Musharraf believed that by retaining the power he grabbed in the October 1999 coup d’etat and “legally sanctioned” by a Supreme Court that took an oath of preserving and promoting his constitutional decrees, he would reform the state and politics of Pakistan. The sincerity of his intentions notwithstanding, his political means for reform have been defective.

The opposition rejects the LFO. It sought amendments in key clauses. It demanded it be brought to the elected Parliament for approval. After all, one of Musharraf’s predecessors, Gen. Zia ul-Haq, too had to submit to the will of Parliament.

The principal critique of the LFO however remains that it prevents proper checks and balances.

But the strategy the three main opposition parties pursued was different. The PPP and PML (N), because of their self-exiled leadership, was forced to focus on some package deal for its leadership abroad as quid pro quo for supporting the LFO. Meanwhile the MMA, now in power in the NWFP and Balochistan, was concerned with the constitutional issues arising from the LFO.

The MMA through dozens of negotiations with various establishment teams including soldiers, politicians and bureaucrats finally seems close to working out an agreement.

A likely agreement will include four key elements. One, presidential powers under 58(2) b will be curtailed. Instead of dissolution of assemblies, only the Cabinet will be dismissed. This strengthens the elected members of Parliament. The elected members would not be beholden to the president to carry on in office. Powers to dismiss the Cabinet could be justified, for a limited period of time, as a means of maintaining checks and balances in the exercise of state power.

The second element is that the National Security Council will be established through a law passed by Parliament instead of being established under a constitutional provision. Article 152(A) will be converted into law. Thirdly, the judges serving through an extension period will retire within one year of the passage of the LFO amendment. Finally, the president will have to take a vote of confidence instead of contesting an election to “legalize” his presidency

The establishment still hopes to convince the MMA to change its position on the vote of confidence and wants MMA support for the president.

But the MMA has opted to de-couple the issue of supporting the president when he seeks a vote of confidence from the house from the LFO package.

While it does not resolve all issues of power, specifically of civil-military relations, overall an agreement on the LFO will tip the balance of power in favor of Parliament. It has been an effort to instill a degree of accountability in the exercise of state power.

— Nasim Zehra is a Fellow at Harvard University Asia Center.