Since April 2006, the president and the government of Sri Lanka have taken a number of initiatives to facilitate the realization of a negotiated settlement to resolve the national problem. Significant among them is the endeavor to develop constitutional proposals with broad support.
The main aim has been to find an indigenous solution to end decades of internal strife, and enable all people to live in dignity and peace in Sri Lanka.
The government has emphasized the fact that the task of finding a political solution to the national question requires a multiparty effort and an inclusive approach. This involved the formation of the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) and the appointment of a panel of experts on July 11 in the hope of reaching a national consensus among political parties. The mandate given to the APRC and the panel of experts as outlined in the president’s speech is to “fashion creative options that satisfy the minimum expectations ... as well as provide a comprehensive approach to the resolution of the national question.”
The aim of the government is to engage the various political parties, discuss their different approaches and through their deliberations arrive at a broad framework that will generate consensus. The APRC and the panel of experts met regularly from July 2006 and confirmed that they made significant progress in their deliberations.
The members of the APRC visited India in October 2006 at the invitation of the Indian government, with a view to gaining an understanding of the Indian Constitution, center-state relations and the working of grass-roots level self-governing institutions such as the Panchayati Raj system. The panel of experts presented its preliminary reports to the APRC on Dec. 6, 2006.
The chairman of the APRC presented a discussion paper to the APRC members on Jan. 8, 2007, taking into consideration the views expressed during the APRC deliberations and also by the experts panel in preliminary reports. The UNP began to participate in APRC deliberations and presented the party views to the APRC on Jan. 8, 2007. The SLFP submitted the party views to the APRC on May 25, 2007.
All APRC members have submitted their views on the chairman’s discussion paper to the APRC, except for the Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which withdrew from the APRC in December 2006 and the Western Peoples Front (WFP), which withdrew in August 2006. The latter has, however, resumed participation in the APRC meetings since June 4, 2007. The JHU has participated actively in the APRC and contributed to consensus in several areas.
The government initiated discussions with the main opposition party, the United National Party (UNP), on Sept. 15, 2006 primarily to facilitate reaching political consensus in the south. Discussions were based on a 6- point common minimum national agenda, which involved peace, good governance, electoral reform and social development. The two parties signed an MOU on Oct. 23, 2006. The UNP in the MOU extended its support to the government “in its pursuit of a negotiated settlement to the ongoing conflict while opposing terrorism in all its manifestations and upholding human rights.”
A group of UNP members have now joined the government and accepted Cabinet positions, stating that this would facilitate the implementation of the MOU. However, they do not participate in the APRC, which is the prerogative of the official UNP. This group, along with other parties such as the EPRLF and PLOTE, have submitted suggestions, though these do not have the status of official proposals. The APRC engaged in discussion with such groups in its consultative process.
Given the requirement that a proposal be submitted soon, the APRC was given a deadline of Aug. 15. The chairman, therefore, produced a consolidated document taking into account the various suggestions, and over the last couple of months they have met twice a week and reached consensus on most issues, and these have been ratified in general at a party leaders meeting.
Until recently there remained three issues on which varied views were still presented. Following the development of working proposals, the APRC has now adjourned for final consultations with party leaders. The chairman is confident that, though an accepted draft was not ready by Aug. 15, it will not be long delayed. Once presented, the necessary legislation should be formulated within a couple of months.
The LTTE is not likely to approve of any package that does not give them full control of the north and east, but their influence is less since the recovery of control of the east by the government. The one uncertain factor is the UNP, but its representative, Choksy, participated actively in the APRC initially and the chairman of the APRC has remained in touch with him.
The chairman is confident that the UNP in general will not disrupt positive measures. In this context the recent suggestions of the international community that the UNP should participate actively in discussions has been heartening. Most recently, professor Vitharna has issued a statement to make clear the positive nature of the discussions.
The APRC is now concentrating on devolution based on three levels, with increasing consensus that power should be shared between the center, the provinces and also smaller units of local government. Meanwhile, the main opposition UNP has indicated that it is no longer committed to a federal system, which had earlier seemed a bone of potential contention.
Meanwhile, quite different attempts to disrupt the peace process have been in train. This relates to the current approach adopted by the LTTE, following the failure of its efforts to move toward a military option.
To consider this, it is necessary to recapitulate what has happened since the Cease-Fire Agreement was signed in February 2002. Unfortunately, it was vitiated from the start by constant violations on the part of the LTTE, around 2000 ruled as violations during the period of the UNP government (to April 2004) and close on 2000 since until the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission ceased to deliver rulings. Unfortunately, as described recently by the original executive leaders of the Peace Secretariat, the CFA was a flawed document that did not ensure remedial action. During the entire period the Sri Lankan government has been ruled to have violated the CFA only around 300 times.
Violations ruled as such related largely to forced recruitment of children by the LTTE. Killing of members of other Tamil political groupings, which had been disarmed by the government under the CFA, was common, while weapons were brought in on a massive scale, with a boat identified as such by the SLMM being blown up. Though condoning such violations seemed the practice initially, threats to security led to the president taking over the Ministry of Defense and then, when the compromises she suggested did not prove acceptable to other political forces, a dissolution of Parliament which led to the president’s party winning easily and taking control of the government in April 2004.
Meanwhile, the LTTE had withdrawn from talks in April 2003, citing neglect of the humanitarian needs of the people of the north and east as well as the failure to address structural issues. The UNP responded, as required by the LTTE, with proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority, which involved total LTTE control including of all regional bodies in the east. The original pledge of the minister of constitutional affairs to hold elections to local bodies was countermanded by the prime minister. The LTTE responded with counterproposals that also inter alia gave them full control of the adjoining seas.
These proposals fell into abeyance with the change of government. The LTTE refused to return to talks, though did informally discuss with the president an authority to oversee post-Tsunami reconstruction, but the structure of that authority was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. By this stage, however, an election for the Presidency had been decided on.
The incumbent president was debarred from seeking a third term, and her party nominated the incumbent prime minister who defeated the UNP prime minister. The new president took office in November 2005. Along with attempts to characterize the new government as hard-line, the LTTE almost immediately began a campaign of terrorism, which led to the deaths of nearly 100 servicemen over the next couple of months. The government, however, refrained from retaliation, and concentrated on urging the LTTE to return to negotiations.
Meanwhile, pressures were mounting internationally on the LTTE, partly because amongst their activities was the assassination of the former Tamil Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar who had been one of the leading supporters of Prime Minister Rajapaksa in his obtaining the party nomination for the Presidency.
The LTTE returned to negotiations in February 2006, after a lapse of nearly three years. Though negotiations seem to have been cordial, the LTTE claimed later that they had been promised that the Karuna faction would be disarmed, and they thought the failure of the government to do this was evidence of a lack of good faith.
The Karuna faction was a group of the LTTE that had broken away in early 2004, and was thought strong in the eastern province. Some candidates loyal to them in the April 2004 election had been forced to resign from the TNA, the group in Parliament working with the LTTE, and some of them were subsequently killed. However, the Karuna group remained militarily strong, and has now set up a political party, which has expressed its intention of contesting elections.
The government position was that the CFA required disarming of paramilitary forces, but this did not include the LTTE, and the Karuna faction had been part of the LTTE and was therefore not subject to that clause of the CFA.
Given the fate of the actual paramilitary groups that had been disarmed in 2002, it was not likely that the Karuna group could in any case have been disarmed without much violence, given the threat they faced from an LTTE, which had by 2006 expanded control of areas in the east far beyond what they had held in 2002.
Whatever the reason, the LTTE stepped up terrorist attacks around April, including an attempt on the life of the army commander (which involved several casualties though he himself escaped) and the assassination of the army No 3. The LTTE also withdrew from a second negotiation arranged in Oslo in June 2006 to which they had been flown, to the embarrassment of the Norwegian facilitators who had to break this news to the Sri Lankan delegation on the morning of the scheduled meeting.
Instead, at the end of July, concerted attacks were launched, on Mutur in the east and Muhumalai in the north. The government decided to respond forcefully, and after initial successes decided to advance to preclude such attacks in the future. An offensive in the north failed, but carefully planned operations in the east, that included almost no civilian casualties, led to the full liberation of the province in July 2007.
The LTTE, meanwhile, had returned to talks in October 2006, but after one fairly positive day was recalled after a telephone call from the leadership in Kilinochchi. Since then it has refused to return to negotiations, but has instead introduced conditions, which have changed over time. The government is committed to negotiations, but will neither impose nor accept conditions.
In theory the CFA still lasts, in that the government formally eschews military action except in terms of self defense as allowed by the CFA. The LTTE similarly does not usually accept responsibility for terrorist activity that has claimed several lives, though these are highlighted in its publicity.
The SLMM for instance, in the last of its rulings, delivered in April 2007, recorded 160 violations by the LTTE, killing nearly 100 soldiers and civilians. This was over a 6-month period, while over 3 months within this the government was ruled to have violated the CFA seven times through similar attacks, with four deaths.
Following the government takeover of the east and rapid resettlement of displaced people, the LTTE responded with threats to attack economic targets as well as military ones. The international media as well as NGOs working in the region have reported forced conscription in LTTE controlled areas, with all families required to deliver at least one member.
Increased and more efficient security measures have, however, helped to prevent terrorist activity in the south though constant vigilance continues essential. In addition it is likely that the LTTE will restrict terrorist action since its current stance is to claim instead that the government is engaged in human rights violations. Obvious evidence of its own disregard for the rule of law will affect this position.
Thus currently there is a concerted campaign to accuse the government of violating human rights. This is led by the LTTE, though some support has been forthcoming from some elements in the opposition, since this would facilitate their return to power. Unfortunately, this cause has found some support in recent calls for UN monitoring of human rights, in terms of what is called the responsibility to protect. However, the rationale for such calls has been inadequate, since it involves much manipulation of facts. Recent responses to two such efforts have not been answered.
These interventions are largely confined to Colombo and elite political commentators. In the country at large business continues much as usual. The peace process meanwhile involves coordination with Chambers of Commerce nationwide, and involving them in capacity building partnerships and credit schemes to expand ownership of and involvement in the peace dividend that is now available in the East.
— Professor Rajiva Wijesinha is the secretary-general of the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process in Sri Lanka.