THE case of a Jordanian man accused of attempting to bomb a Dallas building last week is a new development in the way the US law enforcement agencies go about fighting terrorism in this country. During the 1990s and in the years following Sept. 11, the government had relied on the words of informants to build legal cases against suspects accused of terrorist crimes. The charges against Husam Al-Smadi too were based on the work of an informant. The difference, however, is that the government went as far as giving Al-Smadi a fake car bomb which he believed was a real bomb and went on to drive it under the garage of a Dallas skyscraper.

In so doing, Al-Smadi met the other legal requirement for a crime to legally occur, actus reus or criminal act, in addition to his intentions, mens rea or criminal intent. The government strategy here, so it seems, is to lock Al-Smadi in an airtight legal case to convict in order to avoid its past failures in obtaining convictions in its terrorism cases.

In the past few years, the US law enforcement agencies have depended more on the work of informants who supplied them with erroneous information that was geared to help the informants make financial gains at the expense of truth or facts.

In 2006 the government arrested a group of African-Americans known as the “Liberty Seven” for plotting to bomb buildings in Chicago and other US cities. This case in large part was based on the words of informants who eventually were discredited and the case went for mistrial twice.

This is also what happened in the case of Mohammad Salah in Chicago who was accused by the FBI of terrorism and other lesser charges based on the words of a local informant. The FBI ended up dropping its informant after it was revealed that he had lied to the FBI and Salah was eventually acquitted of the terrorism charges. The case of the 19-year-old Al-Smadi seems to be unique in some respects. The government does not allege here that there is a “network” of terrorists that Al-Smadi was part of, nor there is a kind of ideological base for his actions. Moreover, Al-Smadi is not known to be an “extremist.” He lived a normal life in his working- class neighborhood near Dallas.

One might ask why then Al-Smadi agreed knowingly to drive a car that was supposed to be packed with explosives in order to blow it up under the building.

We still do not know the details of the government case against Al-Smadi and the reasoning behind his “criminal intent.” However, we can speculate.

Al-Smadi might have harbored resentment against US policies in the Middle East, particularly the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the US support for Israel’s policies against Arabs and Palestinians. But this is legitimate, as anyone can object to US policies and the Israeli actions so long as those actions and intentions were limited to peaceful means.

An informant however, enters the picture; exploits the young and impressionable man by transferring his passive resentment against the US policies into an actionable resentment. This is the most likely scenario in this case. It is hard to believe that a 19-year-old man would want to commit a terror act in the US without a local or international “terrorist network” lending him material and moral support to commit such an act. The only support Al-Smadi got for his actions was that of the FBI informant who perhaps by way of manipulation provided him with “moral support”, “ideological foundations for his actions” and “material and financial support.”

Ali Younes is a Washington-based writer and Middle East analyst. He can be reached at: [email protected]