Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan went to Moscow late last month with high hopes. He sought President Vladimir Putin’s backing for a Turkish assault on the Kurds east of the Euphrates, the setting up of a “safe zone” stretching 32 kilometers into northern Syria, and the takeover of the Kurdish town of Manbij after the US soldiers leave.
However, he did not get Russian support on any of these points. Putin made it clear that Syrian unity and sovereignty demanded that the Kurds be accepted as an integral part of a federal Syria. Until this is achieved, a buffer zone could be set up at the Syria-Turkey border, but it should be patrolled by Syrian government forces — not Turkish troops — until the new constitutional processes are in force. For the same reason, he also opposed the Turkish takeover of Manbij.
Putin reminded Erdogan about the unfinished business relating to Idlib. The extremists from Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS, the erstwhile Jabhat Al-Nusra) have beaten the Turkish-sponsored Free Syrian Army and taken control of 70 percent of the town. For Putin, the defeat of these terrorists is the highest priority.
The Russian president then sprang a surprise: He recalled that the Turkish-Syrian Adana agreement, concluded in October 1998, was still effective and guaranteed Turkey’s border security. In public remarks, Putin said that this topic had been discussed “thoroughly, fully and actively” by the two leaders. A day later, Erdogan told a Turkish audience: “After our meeting with Putin, we understand much better the need to bring the Adana accord back on the agenda and to concentrate on it with determination.”
In this pact, Syria had agreed to end its support for the dissident Turkish Kurds from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and not allow its territory to be used for any activity against Turkey’s interests. The agreement also provided for close security cooperation between the two countries, including telephone links between senior security officials.
Though Russia and Turkey are allies in the Astana peace process, they have differing perceptions on the Kurdish issue.
Talmiz Ahmad
Though Russia and Turkey are allies in the Astana peace process, they have differing perceptions on the Kurdish issue. Unlike Ankara, Moscow does not view members of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) or its political body, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), as “terrorists.” It also opposes Turkey’s military takeover of Manbij, even providing its own forces to carry out joint patrols with YPG militants in that town.
The revival of the 20-year-old Adana agreement, which has been non-functional for the last eight years, suggests a new Russian game plan for Syria that could reshape the security scenario in the war-torn country. As the conflict is winding down, Putin is pursuing a two-track approach to ensuring long-term stability in the country — promoting Kurdish interaction with the Bashar Assad government and Turkish engagement with Damascus.
This should yield benefits to all the principal parties in the Syrian imbroglio: The Assad government will be able to assert control over territory presently held by the Kurds, while the Kurds will enjoy considerable autonomy in their “homeland” as part of a broader federal arrangement. Turkey will also get the border security it desperately needs on the lines of what it obtained in 1998 — the Adana agreement had enabled it to apprehend PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and thus land a heavy blow on its domestic Kurdish insurgency. This will, of course, require close cooperation with Damascus.
However, while Putin may have initiated a fresh approach to promoting peace in Syria, eight years of conflict have brought several players with diverse interests and deep distrust between them into the national quagmire.
Thus, Turkey has asserted that Adana allows it to send its troops into Syria to fight terrorists. This is disputed by the Assad government, which has pointed out that the agreement allows Turkish forces to come only 5 kilometers into Syria and its operations have to be coordinated with the Syrian government. Damascus has announced its adherence to Adana, but has also reminded Turkey that, under the agreement, it has reciprocal obligations to ensure Syrian security by not harboring hostile elements or occupying Syrian territory.
The Kurds would like to see their safe zone free of all foreign forces and sanctioned by the principal players in the country — Russia, the US, Iran and Turkey. It also wants the many diverse elements accommodated in the Syrian scenario, including Syrian and Kurdish opposition parties.
The US, for its part, would like to see the safe zone patrolled by its European allies, besides Turkey, though no European country has come forward so far. US officials have also floated the alternative idea of the patrolling being done by the “Rojava Peshmerga,” i.e., the Kurdish fighters from Masoud Barzani’s group, the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraqi Kurdistan, which is close to Turkey but would be unacceptable to Syria and to Russia. The US would also like to enforce a no-fly zone across northern Syria, which is opposed by Turkey as it could hamper its future military operations in the region.
In the coming weeks, Syria could see a concerted attack on Idlib by Syrian government forces, with Russian air support, and quiet dialogue between Turkish and Syrian officials. Peace in the country is distant, but not elusive.
- Talmiz Ahmad is an author and former Indian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE. He holds the Ram Sathe Chair for International Studies, Symbiosis International University, Pune, India.