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The preliminary “memorandum of understanding” between the US and Iran constitutes a real test of the difficult path toward peace in the Arabian Gulf, particularly amid the prevailing political and security deadlock. It is a situation that places Gulf, Iranian, and even global economies at risk, and threatens repercussions that extend beyond the energy sector to food, fertilizers, medicine, and various other industries.
This is why several parties are seeking to push toward a practical way out that will pave the way for genuine and serious negotiations between Tehran and Washington over the nuclear issue, and realizing that such talks will require a framework capable of building trust and ending the state of war.
The memorandum of understanding, some of the main provisions of which have been reported by Al Arabiya, focuses on the consolidation of a renewable truce; reopening the Strait of Hormuz within 30 days; the removal of naval mines; allowing the passage of commercial ships and oil tankers without imposing fees on them; and a gradual easing of certain economic restrictions on Iran, while allowing the country to sell some of its oil and perhaps gain access to a very limited portion of its frozen assets abroad. It postpones negotiations over the detailed nuclear issue until later.
Accordingly, the memorandum is not a finalized peace formula but rather an attempt to establish a safe passage through which all parties can move from a state of war to the negotiating table, because the objective now for key Gulf capitals, including Riyadh and Doha, is to de-escalate the situation and reopen the Strait of Hormuz in order to ensure the safe passage of oil tankers and commercial vessels.
What is new in the past few hours is that the diplomatic track has not stalled despite limited US strikes against Iranian targets in southern Iran, which Washington described as a defensive operation targeting boats and launch sites linked to threats against maritime navigation or American forces. This means there are rules of engagement that have not been breached, and the US continues to negotiate while applying calculated pressure in an effort to demonstrate that it remains in a position of strength and will not bow to Iranian-imposed conditions.
For its part, Iran realizes that continuing to block or threaten the Strait of Hormuz will escalate the tensions from a US-Iranian dispute into an international crisis affecting the energy, insurance, and shipping sectors, and would make the nation appear, in the eyes of its neighbors and the international community, as a rogue state practicing maritime piracy.
Amid these intertwined details, where diplomacy overlaps with maximum economic pressure and limited military operations, the presence of Saudi Arabia creates a regional balance and establishes a safety net that prevents the Arabian Gulf from sliding into a new war with uncertain consequences. In its declared diplomatic efforts, as well as those that are conducted away from the media spotlight, Riyadh is concerned with preventing the return and expansion of conflict; protecting the security of the Arabian Gulf; reaffirming the freedom of maritime navigation as it existed before the outbreak of the US-Israeli war with Iran in February; and avoiding granting Tehran any free gains without clear commitments in return.
The participation of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in a group call with President Donald Trump and the leaders of Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Turkiye, and Pakistan’s army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir, reflects Saudi Arabia’s desire for any understanding reached with Tehran to be part of an integrated framework for regional security, rather than merely a deal between the US and Iran.
The main objective is to de-escalate the situation and reopen the Strait of Hormuz to ensure the safe passage of oil tankers and commercial vessels.
Hassan Al-Mustafa
These Saudi efforts converge with active Qatari diplomacy, which serves as a practical mediation role complementing Pakistan’s efforts.
Discussions between Qatar’s prime minister and foreign minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, and the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, have focused on securing a ceasefire agreement between the US and Iran while addressing the root causes of the crisis through peaceful means. This means that Qatar is not acting outside the Gulf framework, but rather within an integrated approach in which Riyadh provides the broader political framework while Doha opens channels and manages the gray areas with Tehran and Washington.
As for Pakistan, the main mediator, its role stems from the fact that it is a major state that shares land and sea borders with Iran, as well as from its ability to speak to Tehran in the language of “Islamic fraternity” and to Washington in the language of “security interests” while maintaining close relations with Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Amid this tireless diplomatic activity, several obstacles to the memorandum of understanding emerge. The first is whether the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran will be full and immediate, or gradual and subject to security tests? Secondly, will the easing of US sanctions, oil restrictions and the release of some frozen Iranian assets precede any nuclear commitments by Tehran, or be tied to specific and documented steps?
Thirdly, will Iran commit to the restraint of its allied groups in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, or will the agreement remain confined to Hormuz and the nuclear issue? And fourthly, will Trump succeed in separating the Iran track from his desire to expand the Abraham Accords, especially since Saudi Arabia links recognition of Israel to a credible road map toward the establishment of a Palestinian state as part of a two-state solution in accordance with UN resolutions and international legitimacy?
The realistic path forward begins with addressing the issues in phases, beginning with consolidation of the truce and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz under clear international maritime supervision. Secondly, limited economic measures that provide Iran with calculated and nonexcessive incentives. Thirdly, nuclear negotiations carried out in accordance with a specified timetable, accompanied by technical guarantees from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Fourthly, a broader regional track addressing the issues of ballistic missiles, proxy organizations, energy security, and Iran’s conduct in relation to neighboring states.
It can therefore be said that peace in the Arabian Gulf is possible but will not be easily achieved amid these complexities. The possibility exists nonetheless because all parties have paid high economic, political, and military costs of war. However, the success of the memorandum of understanding will depend on transforming the truce from a temporary ceasefire into a system of mutual commitments that lay the foundations for a lasting and sustainable peace, and pull all parties out of their current state of political and security fragility.
• Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher specializing in Islamist movements, the evolution of religious discourse, and relations between the Gulf states and Iran.
X: @Halmustafa