Analysis: Can Iraq transform itself from regional battleground to diplomatic broker?

WASHINGTON: After months of a regional war that has left Iraq once again caught between Iran, the Gulf and the US, Baghdad is attempting an ambitious diplomatic pivot — hosting talks it hopes will transform the country from a battleground into a broker.

The proposal, announced by Iraq’s Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, would bring together Iraq, Iran, and the six GCC states to discuss regional security and economic partnerships.

Tehran has welcomed the initiative, presenting it as part of a new Gulf security framework led by regional states rather than distant foreign powers. For Baghdad, the proposal offers a chance to present Iraq as more than an arena for regional rivalries.

But analysts say Iraq’s ability to play that role will depend not only on its willingness to host talks, but also on whether it can convince the Gulf states it can control armed groups operating within its territory.

“Iraq would benefit diplomatically from facilitating another dialogue track between Iran and the Gulf given its current poor relations with the GCC countries following the Iran war,” Lahib Higel, senior Iraq analyst at the International Crisis Group, told Arab News.

The initiative comes at a sensitive moment for Iraq’s new government under Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi, who is seeking to increase diplomatic engagement with the Gulf states, attract investment, and demonstrate Baghdad’s capacity on the regional stage.

It also comes as Al-Zaidi seeks to reposition Iraq’s relationship with Washington.

During his first overseas visit since taking office, he met US President Donald Trump at the White House, where the US leader hailed him as a “champion” and pledged closer economic cooperation, including new energy investments.

Al-Zaidi, who has made tackling corruption, curtailing the power of the militias, and reviving Iraq’s economy central to his premiership, told Trump that “American forces will leave, and American companies will enter,” reflecting his ambition to shift bilateral ties from a security-focused partnership toward investment and reconstruction.

The Iran conflict, however, has complicated Iraq’s hopes for engagement with the Gulf states.

All six GCC states have reported attacks, interceptions, or damage linked to Iranian missile and drone activity during the war. Reports that some of these attacks were launched from Iraqi territory have heightened concerns over Baghdad’s ability to contain Iran-backed groups.

Those concerns will likely shape how Gulf states respond to Iraq’s proposal.

Asked how much Iraq’s credibility as a mediator depends on its ability to control armed groups, Higel said: “It may be a dealbreaker for the Gulf countries, but they are also keen to give the new government a chance.”

That mix of concern and openness was reflected this week in Riyadh. On Tuesday, the Saudi Arabia government welcomed discussions between the Kingdom and Iraq, including Baghdad’s commitment not to allow Iraqi territory to be used for military action against the Gulf states.

That combination of caution toward Baghdad’s capabilities but willingness to test the new government may shape the proposed dialogue.

While they have yet to attach specific demands to Iraq’s proposed facilitation role, Higel said that “in general, the Gulf states expect the government to do more to contain the groups that have launched attacks on the GCC countries.”

Iraq has long tried to strike a fine balance between competing powers, maintaining relations with both Washington and Tehran while also seeking closer ties with its Gulf neighbors.

Higel said Iraq could theoretically move from being an arena for regional rivalries to an actor shaping regional security, “but it’s a long shot given that Iraq is stuck in between the US and Iran.”

“Over the last two decades it has had to find ways to walk a tightrope,” she said.

As long as hostilities continue between Iran on one side and the US and Israel on the other, she added, a genuine transformation will remain elusive.

Iran’s support for the Baghdad initiative is also open to competing interpretations.

“Iran sees an opportunity to reduce regional tensions, weaken efforts to isolate it diplomatically, secure greater acceptance as a legitimate regional stakeholder, and, importantly, bypass the US,” John Calabrese, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, told Arab News.

Iran has long argued against a dominant US role in Gulf security. In May, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Esmaeil Baqaei, urged Gulf countries not to rely on what he called “borrowed security,” claiming that the presence of US forces in the region was a source of instability.

“A Baghdad forum allows Tehran to demonstrate that Gulf security should be managed by regional states themselves. This has been the Islamic Republic’s longstanding position,” Calabrese said.

He added that Iran’s influence in Iraq gives Tehran another reason to view Baghdad as a useful venue.

Gulf countries, however, have not treated Iraq solely as an extension of Iranian influence. In recent years, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have expanded diplomatic and economic engagement with Baghdad through energy, infrastructure, and investment initiatives.

Gulf states are unlikely to see an Iraq-hosted dialogue as automatically serving Iran’s interests, “given that they have welcomed Al-Zaidi’s appointment and seek to bring Iraq out of Iran’s orbit,” Higel said.

“They may, however, doubt Iraq’s ability to play such a role at the moment.”

This distinction highlights a practical challenge facing Baghdad. Iraq may be acceptable as a venue for talks, but whether it can become a broker of a broader regional security process is far less certain.

Calabrese said concrete, confidence-building measures would be required for any process to be taken seriously. “At this point, words mean nothing,” he said.

Such measures could include “greater transparency regarding missile and drone activity, stronger commitments to maritime deconfliction, and tangible steps to restrain Iran-backed armed groups from actions that could trigger regional escalation.”

Calabrese said Tehran’s support for a new security framework is likely “a pragmatic adjustment” rather than a strategic shift.

“I see little evidence that Iran has abandoned its reliance on deterrence through missiles, proxies, and asymmetric capabilities,” he said. “If anything, the circumstances and dynamics of the war have proven the value of these tools.”

This raises a central question about the Baghdad proposal: whether Tehran is prepared to place meaningful limits on the tools that have shaped its regional posture.

“For Iran, Iraq serves several functions,” Calabrese said. “It is an important strategic neighbor, an economic partner, and an arena where Tehran retains considerable political influence.”

At the same time, Iraq is not simply a passive venue. Baghdad has sought to maintain relations with Iran, the US and the GCC, while Gulf capitals have also increased their outreach to Iraq. That balancing act, Calabrese said, “might make Iraq a credible platform for regional dialogue.”

Baghdad has experience hosting regional talks. The country hosted early rounds of the Saudi-Iranian dialogue before the 2023 China-brokered normalization agreement between Riyadh and Tehran.

Hosting talks, however, is a far cry from building a sustainable security framework, which would require addressing missile and drone activity, armed groups, maritime security and deep mistrust after months of conflict.

“Mistrust is surely a big one,” Calabrese said of the obstacles to a durable security process.

That mutual mistrust has deepened because Tehran regards Gulf states as complicit in the US and Israeli-led campaign against them, while “Gulf states are outraged by having been the targets of Iranian retaliation,” he added.

Al-Zaidi has sought to reassure both Washington and Gulf capitals that his government intends to strengthen the state’s monopoly on force.

He has pledged that no armed groups will be permitted to operate outside government control once the US-led coalition formally ends its mission in Iraq on Sept. 30.

While several Iran-aligned factions have signaled a willingness to cooperate, others continue to reject disarmament, underscoring the political and security constraints facing Baghdad.

The US and Israel could also complicate any Baghdad-led process.

“I also don’t know how the US would respond, much less Israel,” Calabrese said. “Either or both could prove to be spoilers.”

Those challenges have become even more acute following the latest escalation between Washington and Tehran.

This week, US forces struck Iranian military targets linked to operations around the Strait of Hormuz, prompting Iranian missile and drone attacks against US partners in the Gulf, while explosive drones were intercepted over Iraq’s Kurdistan region.

The renewed fighting has reinforced the urgency of Baghdad’s proposed dialogue, but also highlighted how quickly regional tensions can outpace Iraqi diplomacy.

That leaves Iraq trying to convene a dialogue amid multiple overlapping rivalries: Iran and the Gulf, Iran and the US, Iran and Israel, and Iraq and the armed groups operating inside its territory.

For Al-Zaidi’s government, the potential rewards are clear: a successful summit could improve Iraq’s regional standing, help repair relations with the Gulf states, and strengthen Baghdad’s case for investment in energy, infrastructure, and reconstruction.

But the risks are also clear.

If the forum is seen as giving Tehran a diplomatic opening without reducing attacks or restraining armed groups, any Gulf doubts about Baghdad’s role are unlikely to disappear.

If Iraq cannot prevent Iran-backed armed groups operating within its territory from pulling it into further regional escalation, its role may remain that of host rather than broker.

For now, Iraq’s opening is narrow but real. The Gulf states appear willing to give Al-Zaidi’s government a chance, Iran sees value in a regional track, and Baghdad has every reason to seize a diplomatic role that could bring it recognition, investment, and renewed relevance.

While Baghdad has demonstrated its willingness to bring parties to the table, its ability to control what happens beyond it remains the greater test.