Houthis’ startling capture of Sanaa

I write this week from New York, where the capture of Yemen’s capital Sanaa by Houthi rebels on Sept. 21 has become a major topic of discussion. But questions abound about how it happened so quickly and who in Yemen and from outside aided and abetted the Houthis.
Coincidently, the Friends of Yemen, a gathering of about 50 countries and international and regional organizations, held a meeting in New York on Sept. 24, just three days after the event. The conference, the 8th since 2010, was meant to show international support for Yemen’s peaceful transition. Participants, who are normally well-informed about events in Yemen, appeared dumbfounded by the takeover and the quick capitulation of military and security forces.
Yemen’s main delegation was unable to travel as Sanaa airport was shut down. The UN Secretary General’s special envoy, too, was stuck in Yemen. His presence at the conference was especially anticipated to answer questions about the UN position and its role in the events. The Houthi takeover took place immediately after he had visited Saada, their stronghold in the north, where he announced that a deal between the government and the rebels had been reached.
The Houthis apparently used UN talks as a cover for their land grab and the final push into Sanaa. Their low-key approach was a ruse to convince observers that they had only limited goals, such as securing their northern stronghold, getting access to the sea, or slightly modifying the border of their province.
But there were clear signs from the very start that the Houthis, with support from Iran, had something big in mind. After the Houthis’ capture of Amran, some 50 km north of the capital, on July 8, I related in Arab News (Is it Yemen’s turn to slip into chaos? (July 14, 2014) the fears of many that Houthis’ next target would be Sanaa. That fear proved justified; the control of Amran and the region surrounding the capital, including the international airport, turned out to be a prelude to capturing Sanaa. The takeover of Amran significantly increased Houthi influence on security and political calculi in Yemen, something you could feel in the reluctance of many to criticize their actions, let alone contemplate use of force to reverse them.
After the takeover of Sanaa on Sept. 21, there was jubilation in Iran, betraying its close but secret relationship with the rebels. While formal government reaction was fairly measured, some politicians could not hide their triumphal glee. Tehran city representative in the Iranian Parliament, Alireza Zakani, reportedly offered this perspective: “Three Arab capitals have to date ended in Iran’s hands and belong to the Islamic revolution. Sanaa has now become the fourth.” He added that Iran considered Yemen’s revolution to be an extension of its own and that 14 out of its 20 provinces would soon come under Houthi control. He said revolution would not stop in Yemen!
The final statement issued by the Friends of Yemen co-chairs (Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom and Yemen) “condemned in the strongest terms the recent fighting in Sanaa by the Houthis and militia groups.” It also “condemned the use of force to achieve political objectives” and “urged all groups to uphold a permanent cease-fire.” Most importantly, and in response to Houthis’ taking over government offices and setting up checkpoints throughout Sanaa, they called “for the legitimate government authorities to have sole and full control over security and public institutions in Sanaa.”
The Houthi quick takeover while security and military personnel idly stood by smelled of complicity. President Abdrabbu Mansour Hadi openly blamed the capitulation on a “conspiracy involving internal and external powers.” Most likely, he had in mind former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and Iran. Saleh was believed to have persuaded security and military commanders to acquiesce in the Houthi takeover, convinced that they were only after their (and Saleh’s) arch enemies — the Islah Party leadership and supporters. Iran, on the other hand, provided funding, weapons and ideological support.
The Americans, like many others, appeared in disbelief as it took them several days to issue a detailed response. On Sept. 25, the US issued a travel warning and ordered a temporary reduction in the number of American personnel in Yemen. Its embassy continued to operate albeit with reduced staff.
On Sept. 27, the US issued a more detailed assessment, condemning the “ongoing hostile and aggressive actions against the Yemeni government and political targets and calls for all parties to implement all aspects of the Peace and National Partnership agreement, in particular the turning over of all medium and heavy weapons to the State.”
It also denounced “elements seeking to exploit the current security situation to further inflame matters, particularly members of the former Saleh regime and Houthi leadership who continue to use violence to further their own agendas at the expense of the Yemeni people.”
The US said it would step up efforts to pursue sanctions against “individuals who are threatening Yemen’s peace, stability, and security.” The US expressed support for President Hadi’s efforts to implement the “Peace and National Partnership Agreement that builds on the GCC Initiative and National Dialogue Conference Outcomes.”
Compare this measured language with an earlier statement, issued on Aug. 29, where the US “strongly condemned” Houthi actions, naming their leader Abdul Malik Al-Houthi. It said, “We condemn the Houthi’s provocative, aggressive, and destabilizing actions and incitement against the Government of Yemen, the establishment of armed camps in and around Sanaa, and their continued illegitimate control of Amran.”
The August statement further called “on the Houthis to immediately dismantle their armed camps and checkpoints in and around Sanaa; withdraw their forces from Amran, return Amran to Government of Yemen control, and return the weapons looted from the 310th Brigade compound,” among other things.
As Houthis consolidate their hold on Sanaa, some appear resigned to the new fait accompli. But it is unclear what they intend to do next: Will they abide by Yemeni consensus as expressed in the outcome of the National Dialogue Conference, or try to change it? Would they try to return Yemen to the theocracy it was 50 years ago or adopt more balanced positions?
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Email: aluwaisheg@gmail.com