Now with the sudden turn of events in Afghanistan putting the country at one of the most decisive points in its checkered history, it is very important that the international coalition make every move with care and forethought. One wrong step may have the effect of undermining the victories so far achieved by the coalition.
For instance, sending American and British forces into the streets of Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif under the United Nations umbrella “to maintain security” would be a self-defeating move. If the military success is to pave the way for a lasting solution to Afghanistan’s perennial chaos, it is essential that the role of maintaining security should be that of the Afghan people, and seen to be so. The best option, at this point of time, is to entrust that job to the Northern Alliance. Since the US and the UK already treat it as the “transition” government, it is only natural that it be allowed to carry out the responsibilities of a government in the capital, as well as the territories under its control.
The dispatch of foreign forces into Kabul will have many negative fallouts. To begin with, it will arouse the suspicions of the Northern Alliance. Further, it will be seen as an attempt to snatch the victory from the real fighters who made it happen — of course, with American help — and pass the fruit of their efforts to retired warlords in Peshawar and exiles in Rome. Of course, all these forces have a role in Afghanistan. In recognition of this, Rabbani’s government has reserved seats for them in any future government. The Northern Alliance’s Minster of Interior Youns Qanooni, who brokered the deal in Rome last month, announced yesterday in Kabul that they remained committed to the agreement reached with the royal forces to form an interim government, shared between the Northern Alliance and the royalists.
Rabbani, who heads the Northern Alliance and whose government is recognized by the United Nations, should be named interim president. He is the only power in Afghanistan that can move outside its traditional territories. Abdul Sattar Serret, King Zahir Shah’s spokesman in Rome, has close relations with Rabbani, thus ensuring royalist seats in any future government.
The US doesn’t wish to see another Somalia in Afghanistan, and has no desire to interfere in the country’s internal disputes. Its role should be that of the arbitrator. And, if forces are needed on the ground, they should come from Muslim countries. Of course, Pakistan cannot be among them because it has burned all its bridges with its Pashtun allies. The wisest course would be for the Americans to be stationed at a distance, perhaps at the Bagram air base near Kabul or further to the west, in Shendend, near Iran. This area is safer and easier to defend, though such operations would make the Iranians uneasy. The coalition can make the places the bases of their military operations against Al-Qaeda or whatever remains of that organization, using their special forces. But again, Afghans are their best option to track down Al-Qaeda leaders in the difficult terrain. These places can also serve as their headquarters to launch and run the projects and rebuild Afghanistan.
The forces that pose problems for Rabbani are not the royalists or other new groups. His challenge is to rebuild contacts with the local Pashtun leaders who have begun to re-emerge in the wake of the Taleban’s disappearance from the political scene. These leaders are keen to secure a role in the central government. Their main problem is that they are not united and lack a central power that can represent all of them. It is possible for Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, who has been absent from the media for a long while, to assume this role. Head of Ittihad Islami and a veteran Mujahed, Sayyaf is an ally of Rabbani.
However, the absence of “one “dominating Pashtun leader for the time being is not a bad thing, in the present fluid situation. That saves the country from the danger of a repeat of the polarization that happened, among the Mujahedeen in 1992, when they conquered Kabul the first time. They were divided, fighting among themselves, with the late Ahmed Shah Masood and Rabbani leading one group and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar leading the other.
One of the best things that has happened to Afghanistan in this period of transition is that Hekmatyar is now in lran, living in exile. Whoever has any influence with Iranians should ask them to keep him there. It will be the ultimate service they can render to the Afghan people.