Ijtihad, which many statements in the Qur’an and Hadiths make obligatory to the Muslim community, means to exercise mental, intellectual and scholarly effort in order to determine the Islamic view in respect of issues that are presented to a scholar or a judge. Needless to say people’s ability to deduce the meanings of religious texts varies a great deal. So does their ability to appreciate the benefit or harm that is attendant on a particular action. Hence, people may differ in the conclusions they make concerning the same situation, although they refer to the same texts of the Qur’an and the Hadith, and aim to achieve the same goal of securing what is beneficial and preventing harm.
Differences that occur as a result of the above causes are harmless, if not beneficial. But great is the harm that results from holding on fanatically to one’s views, ideas, rulings, or school of thought. Such fanaticism makes people imagine that they have a monopoly of truth and wisdom, making them always correct while they who differ with them are always wrong.
Eminent scholars, across different generations, have criticized such fanaticism. We have learned that Imam Abu Haneefah was once asked whether his views represent the absolute, undoubted truth. He answered: “I honestly do not know whether it may be absolutely false, without doubt.” We have also learned that Imam Malik said: “I am only a human being who may be right at times and wrong at others. Consider my views carefully: whatever is in agreement with the Qur’an and the Sunnah follow it, and leave out whatever does not agree with them.” Imam Al-Shafie used to warn people not to follow his example or the example of anyone else other than the Prophet. Imam Ahmad said: “Do not follow my example, nor the examples of Malik, Al-Shafie, Al-Awza’ie or Al-Thawri. Instead, refer to their sources.” This means referring to the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
The Prophet’s companions, their successors and prominent scholars of later generations used to differ in their views, and they argued with one another. Should two scholars conclude their discussion with agreement, they would be very glad, but if neither of them could convince the other they would continue to respect each other, convinced that they both seek the truth in all honesty. Scholars used to rebuke people who asked them about a controversial issue. Al-Shafie once said to someone who asked him about an issue on which he differed with the Hanafi school of law: “Do you want me to abstain from praying behind Abu Haneefah?” That was a telling comment on those whose aim was to uphold differences without any scholarly basis.
When contemporary scholars confine themselves to look into the books of different schools of Islamic jurisprudence, without considering the evidence on which each view recorded in such books is based to determine its validity, their attitude is unacceptable. In fact, many of them do not do more than refer to such books, as though they were infallible. Sheikh Abd Al-Jaleel Eissa, an eminent contemporary scholar, says in his introduction to a priceless book he wrote on the areas where Muslims must not disagree: “We may not excuse anyone today if he follows in the footsteps of later scholars and confine himself to the views of others as though they were part of revelations, particularly if he disregards the books of the early scholars... Some ill-intentioned people have used such an attitude to find fault with Islam itself.”
It is only by going back to the process of ijtihad and upholding the right, indeed the duty, of competent scholars to resort to it will indeed rid us of the evil of fanaticism. It will also revive people’s confidence in the tolerance and broadmindedness reflected in the Islamic approach to the rights of undertaking research, study and expression. These inevitably entail the right of reply, criticism and discussion. It is through such a scholarly exercise that the right verdict on any issue becomes clear. People will be able to choose the views they feel to be right and better supported by clear evidence.
One of the worst aspects of Arab societies today is that people who value their own opinions are always demanding that they should have the right of expression and advocacy, while denying others the same rights. Nothing can rid us of such social disease, with its serious ramifications, better than upholding the right to the exercise of ijtihad by competent scholars. Perhaps it is important to point out that the worst of these serious ramifications is the rise of new generations of people who fanatically hold on to their views, rejecting every view that differs with theirs as false, and denying others the rights and privileges they claim for themselves. Such people provide the fuel for extremism which is certain to put an end to our intellectual and cultural life.
Countless issues require new ijtihad. And more issues will continue to arise because they are the natural product of the progress and development of human life, with its daily new events and situations. Some of what we take for granted today could not have been dreamed possible a few generations ago.
Islam is a religion suitable for all communities in all generations. How can it be conceivable that it refrains from facing new developments through ijtihad, with scholars outlining for people what is lawful and permissible in every new situation or process, and the limits beyond which they may not go if they are to avoid what is forbidden. It is certainly inconceivable that Muslims today should limit themselves to what past scholars, great as they undoubtedly were, said about the systems of government that prevailed in their world. These systems were all autocratic, with a ruler exercising all powers and obeyed by all groups and individuals alike.
Moreover, now that relations between Muslims and their non-Muslim compatriots have been peaceful and friendly for many generations, is it reasonable that we should conduct such relations on the basis of regulations enacted to suit the time when hostility prevailed between the two parties?
Nor is it admissible that people should be made captive to the views of those scholars who occupy government posts, as these views are forcibly handed out to them day and night in all media channels. This simply does not fit with the nature of our faith which requires that knowledge remains available to all, and its pursuit throughout one’s life a binding duty on all, from childhood to old age. When any person diligently pursues such knowledge and is known to be God-fearing, people will realize that he is the scholar to follow, regardless of what rulers may feel about that.
Because the premises we have pointed out are not reasonable, conceivable or admissible, we are in need of a Fiqh revival.