KHARTOUM, 18 August — Since US-Sudanese relations soured in 1996, Tim Carney is the last US ambassador to serve in Khartoum until today. In the following interview, the ambassador speaks on his take of current Sudanese peace talks, details of terrorism in Sudan in the late 1990s, the complexity of US-Sudanese relations, the necessity of debt forgiveness for Sudan. Regarding Egypt’s relation with Sudan, the ambassador says Egypt was quick to react.
Regarding Osama Bin Laden’s exit in Khartoum in 1996, Ambassador Carney is specific: "I was aware of the effort to move Bin Laden to Saudi Arabia," he says.
Ambassador Carney is in Khartoum for a series of televised panel discussions organized by the London-based Al-Mustakilla satellite TV.
On the current peace talks taking place in the Kenyan city of Machakos, Carney says, "the most important issue at hand — is if the peace process is going to get off the ground."
While he thinks it will, he says the burning questions are how to make it durable — "especially in the north (of Sudan) where you have a problem of managing conflict among the northern elites."
Carney said a big part of the problem is "how does one deal with the legacy of the last 13 years of the national Islamist governance in the Sudan?"
One must also consider how to consolidate the peace, said Carney, "How do you deal with the legacy of the war, the destruction of lives — quite apart from all the death? Another important issue, he said, is "the tolerance of abductions that left so many women and children enslaved."
Carney also expressed concern over Sudanese "attitudes", evidenced by the treatment of southerners, and the belief on the part of southerners who live in the north, that they are, as one respected southerner put it to me, ‘second class citizens.’"
This is where he said the international community could help: "A huge problem in consolidating the peace lies in whether the worldwide community can bring timely assistance. The American track record, in implementing elements of (US Special Envoy John) Danforth effort, is mixed...
"For example, the verification mission created by the agreement in Khartoum and the SPLM (Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement) signed to protect non-combatants have not begun operation by mid-August," said Carney.
"It’s not clear whether the international community, especially United Nations agencies, will be ready to cope with the massive movement of millions of internally displaced who will go home if peace is reached quickly."
Asked which direction he saw US-Sudanese relations heading, the ambassador said all depends on the war ending.
"Once the war ends and given that Khartoum satisfies American questions on the matter of terrorism, the broad set of US concerns lie in humanitarian assistance, which will transform itself to development assistance in being part of the exploitation of Sudan’s natural resources, particularly including oil and minerals, but not forgetting agriculture and helping the new Sudan realize the human rights, objectives that have been so badly breached. Notably including, as I observed earlier, the relationship between Sudan’s Arabs and Africans."
Carney also stressed the importance of Sudan and its relationship with its neighbors:
"Sudan’s economic potential is the future of her relationship with all her neighbors, which up to now has been a destabilizing influence. By developing its economy, Sudan will become a major force for stability in the Greater Horn of Africa and immediately beyond."
Asked about Egypt’s ‘special relationship’ with Sudan, the ambassador did not mince his words: "Egypt is the only country in the region for which Sudan is an utterly vital interest.
The waters of the Nile are the lifeblood of Egypt. "The initial Egyptian reaction on the peace framework agreement that permits possible secession for the south, thereby potentially adding yet another state to deal with over the waters of the Nile, which resulted in plaintive distress rather than a realistic, sensible acceptance that Egypt can play an important role in making unity attractive to southern Sudanese."
"Fortunately, cooler heads seemed to have prevailed in Cairo, and policy is now headed in that direction," he added.
Regarding Sudan’s huge international debts, Carney believes debt forgiveness should be considered. "Sudan owes billions, mostly to various international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and $1.8 billion to the International Monetary Fund. Much of this debt is interest on loans incurred at the urging of the West during the days when we encouraged Sudan to be in the Cold War Coalition against the former USSR.
"The IMF staff seems to be satisfied with the last 5 years of a relatively strict Sudanese macroeconomic performance. At some point, the Paris Club will need to deal with larger questions of external debt and its forgiveness. This is largely in the hands of the United States, and should be possible with real peace. Debt forgiveness is the only way forward for Sudan’s development."
Due to economic impoverishment, he was asked if Sudan had little choice but to invite Islamists in, because of their alleged generous investments in the country. Carney again said no.
"Hassan Al-Turabi came to power 1989 believing that his version of political Islam was on a roll. "He ignored US concerns, and flouted international convention.
"And in 1995, by being an accomplice before and after the fact of the attempted assassination of Hosni Mubarak visiting Addis Ababa for an OAU (Organization of African Unity) summit.
"Sudan’s 1969 welcome to Yasser Arafat began the tradition of establishing a haven for Middle Eastern groups. The Islamists gave enhanced status and facility to such terrorists.
"And it was only partially due to UN sanctions in January 1996 for Sudan’s failure to render three Addis Ababa suspects that a serious debate began in ruling Sudanese circles about the issue.
"The debate was formed and perhaps crystallized when the US withdrew its diplomatic presence, including myself, to residence in Nairobi. I began commuting, once a month, from February 1996 until this very day.
To further confuse the issue of US’s official status in Khartoum, he added: "There is no formal US resident in Khartoum until this very day — although the US charge of affairs is, in fact, resident here in Khartoum."
Concerning terrorism in Sudan and the US opposition to it, Carney said: "I was here at the point when Sudan began to respond to US concerns to Sudanese support for terrorist groups, in 1996-97. Sudan, you will recall, is on the American list of state sponsored terrorism, because it gave assistance, haven and facilities to terror groups. It did not, in fact, itself create or direct, terrorist activities.
"Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration (under whom Carney served as ambassador to Sudan) failed to respond to Khartoum’s overtures on terrorism. "Instead, it foolishly tried to use increased pressure alone to realize US interests. For example, Sudan expelled Osama Bin Laden at US request, and it allowed in mid-1996, the US to photograph camps near Khartoum believed to be used for terrorist training. Sudan also offered to open a dialogue on terrorism issues with appropriate US agencies.
"The Clinton administration’s recognition that its policy to use only pressure had failed, is shown by the dispatch of a counter-terrorism team to Khartoum in May 2000. And by a clumsy effort to move the negotiating process on the civil war to Washington in September of 2000... perhaps Clinton’s administration did not realize that their party would lose the November 2000 elections."
Why, when Khartoum was more than cooperating with the American government, the US retaliated two years later by bombing the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory? "It doesn’t have anything to do with it, it was totally unrelated," said Carney. "Al-Shifa was two years later, in any case. Basically, Washington had decided there was no real intention by the Sudanese to cooperate."
When asked to clarify rumors that Sudan offered Osama bin Laden to the US in 1996 and the US refused, Ambassador Carney said:
"At the time of negotiations on the issue of Bin Laden, I was aware of the effort to move Bin Laden to Saudi Arabia. I was not aware of any formal Sudanese proposal to send him to Washington and I suspect the notion was informally mooted by a Sudanese figure, but it could go nowhere because of a lack of an indictment on Bin Laden in the US."